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Abstract: The fine-tuning of the universe for intelligent life has received a great deal of attention in recent
years, both in the philosophical and scientific literature. The claim is that in the space of possible physical
laws, parameters and initial conditions, the set that permits the evolution of intelligent life is very small.
I present here a review of the scientific literature, outlining cases of fine-tuning in the classic works of Carter,
Carr and Rees, and Barrow and Tipler, as well as more recent work. To sharpen the discussion, the role of the
antagonist will be played by Victor Stenger’s recent book The Fallacy of Fine-Tuning: Why the Universe is
Not Designed for Us. Stenger claims that all known fine-tuning cases can be explained without the need for a
multiverse. Many of Stenger’s claims will be found to be highly problematic. We will touch on such issues as
the logical necessity of the laws of nature; objectivity, invariance and symmetry; theoretical physics and
possible universes; entropy in cosmology; cosmic inflation and initial conditions; galaxy formation; the
cosmological constant; stars and their formation; the properties of elementary particles and their effect on
chemistry and the macroscopic world; the origin of mass; grand unified theories; and the dimensionality of
space and time. I also provide an assessment of the multiverse, noting the significant challenges that it must
face. I do not attempt to defend any conclusion based on the fine-tuning of the universe for intelligent life. This
paper can be viewed as a critique of Stenger’s book, or read independently.
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1 Introduction
The fine-tuning of the universe for intelligent life has
received much attention in recent times. Beginning with
the classic papers of Carter (1974) and Carr & Rees
(1979), and the extensive discussion of Barrow & Tipler
(1986), a number of authors have noticed that very small
changes in the laws, parameters and initial conditions of
physics would result in a universe unable to evolve and
support intelligent life.
We begin by defining our terms. We will refer to the
laws of nature, initial conditions and physical constants of
a particular universe as its physics for short. Conversely,
we define a ‘universe’ be a connected region of spacetime
over which physics is effectively constant1. The claim
that the universe is fine-tuned can be formulated as:
FT: In the set of possible physics, the subset that
permit the evolution of life is very small.
FT can be understood as a counterfactual claim, that is,
a claim about what would have been. Such claims are not
uncommon in everyday life. For example, we can formu-
late the claim that Roger Federer would almost certainly
defeat me in a game of tennis as: ‘in the set of possible
games of tennis between myself and Roger Federer, the
set in which I win is extremely small’. This claim is
undoubtedly true, even though none of the infinitely-
many possible games has been played.
Our formulation of FT, however, is in obvious need of
refinement. What determines the set of possible physics?
Where exactly do we draw the line between ‘universes’?
How is ‘smallness’ being measured? Are we considering
only cases where the evolution of life is physically impos-
sible or just extremely improbable? What is life? We will
press onwith the our formulation of FT as it stands, pausing
to note its inadequacies when appropriate. As it stands, FT
is precise enough to distinguish itself from a number of
other claims for which it is often mistaken. FT is not the
claim that this universe is optimal for life, that it contains
themaximum amount of life per unit volume or per baryon,
that carbon-based life is the only possible type of life, or
that the only kinds of universes that support life are minor
variations on this universe. These claims, true or false, are
simply beside the point.
The reason why FT is an interesting claim is that it
makes the existence of life in this universe appear to be
something remarkable, something in need of explanation.
The intuition here is that, if ours were the only universe,
and if the causes that established the physics of our
universe were indifferent to whether it would evolve life,
then the chances of hitting upon a life-permitting universe
are very small. As Leslie (1989, p. 121) notes, ‘[a] chief
1
We may wish to stipulate that a given observer by definition only
observes one universe. Such finer points will not effect our discussion.
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reason for thinking that something stands in special need
of explanation is that we actually glimpse some tidy way
in which it might be explained’. Consider the following
tidy explanations:
 This universe is one of a large number of variegated
universes, produced by physical processes that ran-
domly scan through (a subset of) the set of possible
physics. Eventually (or somewhere), a life-permitting
universe will be created. Only such universes can be
observed, since only such universes contain observers.
 There exists a transcendent, personal creator of the
universe. This entity desires to create a universe in
which other minds will be able to form. Thus, the entity
chooses from the set of possibilities a universe which is
foreseen to evolve intelligent life2.
These scenarios are neither mutually exclusive nor
exhaustive, but if either or both were true then we would
have a tidy explanation of why our universe, against the
odds, supports the evolution of life.
Our discussion of the multiverse will touch on the so-
called anthropic principle, which we will formulate as
follows:
AP: If observers observe anything, they will observe
conditions that permit the existence of observers.
Tautological? Yes! The anthropic principle is best
thought of as a selection effect. Selection effects occur
whenever we observe a non-random sample of an under-
lying population. Such effects are well known to astron-
omers. An example is Malmquist bias — in any survey of
the distant universe, we will only observe objects that are
bright enough to be detected by our telescope. This
statement is tautological, but is nevertheless non-trivial.
The penalty of ignoring Malmquist bias is a plague of
spurious correlations. For example, it will seem that
distant galaxies are on average intrinsically brighter than
nearby ones.
A selection bias alone cannot explain anything. Con-
sider quasars: when first discovered, they were thought to
be a strange new kind of star in our galaxy. Schmidt
(1963) measured their redshift, showing that they were
more than a million times further away than previously
thought. It follows that they must be incredibly bright.
How are quasars so luminous? The (best) answer is:
because quasars are powered by gravitational energy
released by matter falling into a super-massive black hole
(Zel’dovich 1964; Lynden-Bell 1969). The answer is not:
because otherwise we wouldn’t see them. Noting that if
we observe any object in the very distant universe then it
must be very bright does not explain why we observe any
distant objects at all. Similarly, AP cannot explain why
life and its necessary conditions exist at all.
In anticipation of future sections, Table 1 defines some
relevant physical quantities.
2 Cautionary Tales
There are a few fallacies to keep in mind as we consider
cases of fine-tuning.
2
The counter-argument presented in Stenger’s book (page 252), borrow-
ing from a paper by Ikeda and Jeffreys, does not address this possibility.
Rather, it argues against a deity which intervenes to sustain life in this
universe. I have discussed this elsewhere: ikedajeff.notlong.com
Table 1. Fundamental and derived physical and cosmological parameters
Quantity Symbol Value in our universe
Speed of light c 299792458m s1
Gravitational constant G 6.673 1011m3 kg1 s2
(Reduced) Planck constant h 1.05457148 1034m2 kg s2
Planck mass-energy mPl ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
hc=G
p
1.2209 1022MeV
Mass of electron; proton; neutron me; mp; mn 0.511; 938.3; 939.6MeV
Mass of up; down; strange quark mu; md; ms (Approx.) 2.4; 4.8; 104MeV
Ratio of electron to proton mass b (1836.15)1
Gravitational coupling constant aG¼mp2/mPl2 5.9 1039
Hypercharge coupling constant a1 1/98.4
Weak coupling constant a2 1/29.6
Strong force coupling constant as¼ a3 0.1187
Fine-structure constant a¼ a1a2/(a1þ a2) 1/127.9 (1/137 at low energy)
Higgs vacuum expectation value v 246.2GeV
QCD scale LQCD E200MeV
Yukawa couplings Gi ¼
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
mi=v Listed in Tegmark et al. (2006)
Hubble constant H 71 km s1Mpc1 (today)
Cosmological constant (energy density) L(rL) rL¼ (2.3 103 eV)4
Amplitude of primordial fluctuations Q 2 105
Total matter mass per photon x E4 eV
Baryonic mass per photon xbaryon E0.61 eV
Using the definitions in Burgess &Moore (2006). Many of these quantities are listed in Tegmark et al. (2006), Burgess & Moore (2006, Table A.2) and
Nakamura (2010). Unless otherwise noted, standard model coupling constants are evaluated at mZ, the mass of the Z particle, and hereafter we will use
Planck units: G5 h5 c¼ 1, unless reintroduced for clarity. Note that often in the fine-tuning literature (e.g. Carr & Rees 1979; Barrow & Tipler 1986,
p. 354), the low energy weak coupling constant is defined as awGFme2, where GF ¼ 1=
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
v2 ¼ ð292:8GeVÞ2 is the Fermi constant. Using the
definition of the Yukawa coupling above, we can write this as aw ¼ G2e=2
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p  3 1012. This means that aw is independent of a2.
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TheCheap-Binoculars Fallacy: ‘Don’t waste money buy-
ing expensive binoculars. Simply stand closer to the object
you wish to view’3.We canmake any point (or outcome) in
possibility space seem more likely by zooming-in on its
neighbourhood.Having identified the life-permitting region
of parameter space, we can make it look big by deftly
choosing the limits of the plot. We could also distort
parameter space using, for example, logarithmic axes.
A good example of this fallacy is quantifying the fine-
tuning of a parameter relative to its value in our universe,
rather than the totality of possibility space. If a dart lands
3mm from the centre of a dartboard, is it obviously
fallacious to say that because the dart could have landed
twice as far away and still scored a bullseye, therefore the
throw is only fine-tuned to a factor of two and there is
‘plenty of room’ inside the bullseye. The correct compar-
ison is between the area of the bullseye and the area in
which the dart could land. Similarly, comparing the life-
permitting range to the value of the parameter in our
universe necessarily produces a bias toward underesti-
mating fine-tuning, since we know that our universe is in
the life-permitting range.
The Flippant Funambulist Fallacy: ‘Tightrope-walking
is easy!’, the man says, ‘just look at all the places you
could stand and not fall to your death!’. This is nonsense,
of course: a tightrope walker must overbalance in a very
specific direction if her path is to be life-permitting. The
freedom to wander is tightly constrained. When identify-
ing the life-permitting region of parameter space, the
shape of the region is irrelevant. An elongated life-friendly
region is just as fine-tuned as a compact region of the same
area. The fact that we can change the setting on one cosmic
dial, so long as we very carefully change another at the
same time, does not necessarily mean that FT is false.
The Sequential Juggler Fallacy: ‘Juggling is easy!’, the
man says, ‘you can throw and catch a ball. So just juggle
all five, one at a time’. Juggling five balls one-at-a-time
isn’t really juggling. For a universe to be life-permitting, it
must satisfy a number of constraints simultaneously. For
example, a universe with the right physical laws for
complex organic molecules, but which recollapses before
it is cool enough to permit neutral atomswill not form life.
One cannot refute FT by considering life-permitting
criteria one-at-a-time and noting that each can be satisfied
in a wide region of parameter space. In set-theoretic
terms, we are interested in the intersection of the life-
permitting regions, not the union.
The Cane Toad Solution: In 1935, the Bureau of Sugar
Experiment Stations was worried by the effect of the
native cane beetle on Australian sugar cane crops. They
introduced 102 cane toads, imported from Hawaii, into
parts of Northern Queensland in the hope that they would
eat the beetles. And thus the problem was solved forever,
except for the 200million cane toads that now call eastern
Australia home, eating smaller native animals, and
secreting a poison that kills any larger animal that preys
on them. A cane toad solution, then, is one that doesn’t
consider whether the end result is worse than the problem
itself. When presented with a proposed fine-tuning
explainer, we must ask whether the solution is more
fine-tuned than the problem.
3 Stenger’s Case
We will sharpen the presentation of cases of fine-tuning
by responding to the claims of Victor Stenger. Stenger is a
particle physicist whose latest book, ‘The Fallacy of Fine-
Tuning: Why the Universe is Not Designed for Us’4,
makes the following bold claim:
‘The most commonly cited examples of apparent fine-
tuning can be readily explained by the application of a
little well-established physics and cosmology.ySome
form of life would have occurred in most universes that
could be described by the same physical models as
ours, with parameters whose ranges varied over ranges
consistent with those models. And I will show why we
can expect to be able to describe any uncreated universe
with the same models and laws with at most slight,
accidental variations. Plausible natural explanations
can be found for those parameters that are most crucial
for life.yMy case against fine-tuning will not rely on
speculations beyond well-established physics nor on
the existence of multiple universes.’ (FOFT 22, 24)
Let’s be clear on the task that Stenger has set for
himself. There are a great many scientists, of varying
religious persuasions, who accept that the universe is fine-
tuned for life, e.g. Barrow, Carr, Carter, Davies, Dawkins,
Deutsch, Ellis, Greene, Guth, Harrison, Hawking, Linde,
Page, Penrose, Polkinghorne, Rees, Sandage, Smolin,
Susskind, Tegmark, Tipler, Vilenkin, Weinberg, Wheeler,
Wilczek5. They differ, of course, on what conclusion we
should draw from this fact. Stenger, on the other hand,
claims that the universe is not fine-tuned.
4 Cases of Fine-Tuning
What is the evidence that FT is true? We would like to
have meticulously examined every possible universe and
determinedwhether any form of life evolves. Sadly, this is
currently beyond our abilities. Instead, we rely on sim-
plified models and more general arguments to step out
into possible-physics-space. If the set of life-permitting
universes is small amongst the universes that we have
been able to explore, thenwe can reasonably infer that it is
3
Viz Top Tip: http://www.viz.co.uk/toptips.html
4
Hereafter, ‘FOFT x’ will refer to page x of Stenger’s book.
5
References: Barrow & Tipler (1986), Carr & Rees (1979), Carter
(1974), Davies (2006), Dawkins (2006), Redfern (2006) for Deutsch’s
view on fine-tuning, Ellis (1993), Greene (2011), Guth (2007), Harrison
(2003), Hawking & Mlodinow (2010, p. 161), Linde (2008), Page
(2011b), Penrose (2004, p. 758), Polkinghorne & Beale (2009), Rees
(1999), Smolin (2007), Susskind (2005), Tegmark et al. (2006), Vilenkin
(2006), Weinberg (1994) and Wheeler (1996).
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unlikely that the trend will be miraculously reversed just
beyond the horizon of our knowledge.
4.1 The Laws of Nature
Are the laws of nature themselves fine-tuned? FOFT
defends the ambitious claim that the laws of nature could
not have been different because they can be derived from
the requirement that they be Point-of-View Invariant
(hereafter, PoVI). He says:
‘y[In previous sections] we have derived all of
classical physics, including classical mechanics,
Newton’s law of gravity, and Maxwell’s equations of
electromagnetism, from just one simple principle: the
models of physics cannot depend on the point of view
of the observer. We have also seen that special and
general relativity follow from the same principle,
although Einstein’s specific model for general relativ-
ity depends on one or two additional assumptions.
I have offered a glimpse at how quantum mechanics
also arises from the same principle, although again a
few other assumptions, such as the probability inter-
pretation of the state vector, must be added. y[The
laws of nature] will be the same in any universe where
no special point of view is present.’ (FOFT 88, 91)
4.1.1 Invariance, Covariance and Symmetry
We can formulate Stenger’s argument for this conclu-
sion as follows:
LN1. If our formulation of the laws of nature is to be
objective, it must be PoVI.
LN2. Invariance implies conserved quantities (Noether’s
theorem).
LN3. Thus, ‘when our models do not depend on a
particular point or direction in space or a particular
moment in time, then those models must necessar-
ily [emphasis original] contain the quantities linear
momentum, angular momentum, and energy, all of
which are conserved. Physicists have no choice in
the matter, or else their models will be subjective,
that is, will give uselessly different results for every
different point of view. And so the conservation
principles are not laws built into the universe or
handed down by deity to govern the behavior of
matter. They are principles governing the behavior
of physicists.’ (FOFT 82)
This argument commits the fallacy of equivocation— the
term ‘invariant’ has changed its meaning between LN1
and LN2. The difference is decisive but rather subtle,
owing to the different contexts in which the term can be
used. We will tease the two meanings apart by defining
covariance and symmetry, considering a number of test
cases.
Galileo’s Ship: We can see where Stenger’s argument
has gone wrong with a simple example, before discussing
technicalities in later sections. Consider this delightful
passage fromGalileo regarding the brand of relativity that
bears his name:
‘Shut yourself up with some friend in the main cabin
below decks on some large ship, and have with you
there some flies, butterflies, and other small flying
animals. Have a large bowl of water with some fish in
it; hang up a bottle that empties drop by drop into a
wide vessel beneath it. With the ship standing still,
observe carefully how the little animals fly with equal
speed to all sides of the cabin. The fish swim indiffer-
ently in all directions; the drops fall into the vessel
beneath; and, in throwing something to your friend,
you need throw it no more strongly in one direction
than another, the distances being equal; jumping with
your feet together, you pass equal spaces in every
direction. When you have observed all these things
carefully,yhave the ship proceed with any speed you
like, so long as the motion is uniform and not fluctuat-
ing this way and that. You will discover not the least
change in all the effects named, nor could you tell from
any of them whether the ship was moving or standing
still.’ (Quoted in Healey (2007, chapter 6).).
Note carefully what Galileo is not saying. He is not saying
that the situation can be viewed from a variety of different
viewpoints and it looks the same. He is not saying that we
can describe flight-paths of the butterflies using a coordi-
nate system with any origin, orientation or velocity
relative to the ship.
Rather, Galileo’s observation is much more remark-
able. He is stating that the two situations, the stationary
ship and moving ship, which are externally distinct are
nevertheless internally indistinguishable. The two situa-
tions cannot be distinguished by means of measurements
confined to each situation (Healey 2007, Chapter 6).
These are not different descriptions of the same situation,
but rather different situations with the same internal
properties.
The reason why Galilean relativity is so shocking and
counterintuitive is that there is no a priori reason to expect
distinct situations to be indistinguishable. If you and your
friend attempt to describe the butterfly in the stationary
ship and end up with ‘uselessly different results’, then at
least one of you has messed up your sums. If your friend
tells you his point-of-view, you should be able to perform
a mathematical transformation on your model and repro-
duce his model. None of this will tell you how the
butterflies will fly when the ship is speeding on the open
ocean. An Aristotelian butterfly would presumably be
plastered against the aft wall of the cabin. It would not be
heard to cry: ‘Oh, the subjectivity of it all!’
Galilean invariance, and symmetries in general, have
nothing whatsoever to do with point-of-view invariance.
A universe in whichGalilean relativity did not holdwould
not wallow in subjectivity. It would be an objective,
observable fact that the butterflies would fly differently
in a speeding ship. This is Stenger’s confusion: PoVI does
not imply symmetry.
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Lagrangian Dynamics:We can see this same point in a
more formal context. Lagrangian dynamics is a frame-
work for physical theories that, while originally devel-
oped as a powerful approach to Newtonian dynamics,
underlies much of modern physics. The method revolves
around a mathematical function Lðt; qi; _qiÞ called the
Lagrangian, where t is time, the variables qi parameterise
the degrees of freedom (the ‘coordinates’), and
_qi ¼ dqi=dt. For a system described by L, the equations
of motion can be derived from L via the Euler–Lagrange
equation.
One of the features of the Lagrangian formalism is that
it is covariant. Suppose that we want to use different
coordinates for our system, say si, that are expressed as
functions of the old coordinates qi and t. We can express
the Lagrangian L in terms of t, si and _si by substituting the
new coordinates for the old ones. Crucially, the form of
the Euler–Lagrange equation does not change — just
replace q with s. In other words, it does not matter what
coordinates we use. The equations take the same form in
any coordinate system, and are thus said to be covariant.
Note that this is true of any Lagrangian, and any (suffi-
ciently smooth) coordinate transformation si(t, qj). Objec-
tivity (and PoVI) are guaranteed.
Now, consider a specific Lagrangian L that has the
following special property — there exists a continuous
family of coordinate transformations that leave L
unchanged. Such a transformation is called a symmetry
(or isometry) of the Lagrangian. The simplest case is
where a particular coordinate does not appear in the
expression for L. Noether’s theorem tells us that, for each
continuous symmetry, there will be a conserved quantity.
For example, if time does not appear explicitly in the
Lagrangian, then energy will be conserved.
Note carefully the difference between covariance
and symmetry. Both could justifiably be called
‘coordinate invariance’ but they are not the same thing.
Covariance is a property of the entire Lagrangian
formalism. A symmetry is a property of a particular
Lagrangian L. Covariance holds with respect to all
(sufficiently smooth) coordinate transformations.
A symmetry is linked to a particular coordinate trans-
formation. Covariance gives us no information whatso-
ever about which Lagrangian best describes a given
physical scenario. Symmetries provide strong con-
straints on the which Lagrangians are consistent with
empirical data. Covariance is a mathematical fact about
our formalism. Symmetries can be confirmed or falsi-
fied by experiment.
Lorentz Invariance: Let’s look more closely at some
specific cases. Stenger applies his general PoVI argument
to Einstein’s special theory of relativity:
‘Special relativity similarly results from the principle
that the models of physics must be the same for two
observers moving at a constant velocity with respect to
one another. yPhysicists are forced to make their
models Lorentz invariant so they do not depend on the
particular point of view of one reference framemoving
with respect to another.’
This claim is false. Physicists are perfectly free to postu-
late theories which are not Lorentz invariant, and a great
deal of experimental and theoretical effort has been
expended to this end. The compilation of Kostelecky´ &
Russell (2011) cites 127 papers that investigate Lorentz
violation. Pospelov & Romalis (2004) give an excellent
overview of this industry, giving an example of a Lorentz-
violating Lagrangian:
L ¼ bmcgmg5c
1
2
Hmncsmnc kmmnabAnAb;a; ð1Þ
where the fields bm, km and Hmn are external vector and
antisymmetric tensor backgrounds that introduce a pre-
ferred frame and therefore break Lorentz invariance; all
other symbols have their usual meanings (e.g. Nagashima
2010). A wide array of laboratory, astrophysical and
cosmological tests place impressively tight bounds on
these fields. At the moment, the violation of Lorentz
invariance is just a theoretical possibility. But that’s the
point.
Ironically, the best cure for a conflation of ‘frame-
dependent’ with ‘subjective’ is special relativity. The
length of a rigid rod depends on the reference frame of
the observer: if it is 2 metres long it its own rest frame, it
will be 1 metre long in the frame of an observer passing at
87% of the speed of light6. It does not follow that the
length of the rod is ‘subjective’, in the sense that the length
of the rod is just the personal opinion of a given observer,
or in the sense that these two different answers are
‘uselessly different’. It is an objective fact that the length
of the rod is frame-dependent. Physics is perfectly capa-
ble of studying frame-dependent quantities, like the
length of a rod, and frame-dependent laws, such as the
Lagrangian in Equation 1.
General Relativity:We turn now to Stenger’s discussion
of gravity.
‘Ask yourself this: If the gravitational force can be
transformed away by going to a different reference
frame, how can it be ‘real’? It can’t. We see that the
gravitational force is an artifact, a ‘fictitious’ force just
like the centrifugal and Coriolis forces. y[If there
were no gravity] then there would be no universe.
y[P]hysicists have to put gravity into any model of
the universe that contains separate masses. A universe
with separated masses and no gravity would violate
point-of-view invariance.yIn general relativity, the
gravitational force is treated as a fictitious force like
the centrifugal force, introduced into models to pre-
serve invariance between reference frames accelerat-
ing with respect to one another.’
6
Note that it isn’t just that the rod appears to be shorter. Length
contraction in special relativity is not just an optical illusion resulting
from the finite speed of light. See, for example, Penrose (1959).
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These claims are mistaken. The existence of gravity is not
implied by the existence of the universe, separate masses
or accelerating frames.
Stenger’s view may be rooted in the rather persistent
myth that special relativity cannot handle accelerating
objects or frames, and so general relativity (and thus
gravity) is required. The best remedy to this view to sit
down with the excellent textbook of Hartle (2003) and
don’t get up until you’ve finished Chapter 5’s ‘systematic
way of extracting the predictions for observers who are
not associated with global inertial framesyin the context
of special relativity’. Special relativity is perfectly able to
preserve invariance between reference frames accelerat-
ing with respect to one another. Physicists clearly don’t
have to put gravity into any model of the universe that
contains separate masses.
We can see this another way. None of the invariant/
covariant properties of general relativity depend on the
value of Newton’s constant G. In particular, we can set
G¼ 0. In such a universe, the geometry of spacetime
would not be coupled to its matter-energy content, and
Einstein’s equation would read Rmn¼ 0. With no source
term, local Lorentz invariance holds globally, giving the
Minkowski metric of special relativity. Neither logical
necessity nor PoVI demands the coupling of spacetime
geometry to mass-energy. This G¼ 0 universe is a coun-
terexample to Stenger’s assertion that no gravity means
no universe.
What of Stenger’s claim that general relativity is
merely a fictitious force, to be derived from PoVI and
‘one or two additional assumptions’? Interpreting PoVI as
what Einstein called general covariance, PoVI tells us
almost nothing. General relativity is not the only covari-
ant theory of spacetime (Norton 1995). As Misner,
Thorne & Wheeler (1973, p. 302) note: ‘Any physical
theory originally written in a special coordinate system
can be recast in geometric, coordinate-free language.
Newtonian theory is a good example, with its equivalent
geometric and standard formulations. Hence, as a sieve
for separating viable theories from nonviable theories, the
principle of general covariance is useless.’ Similarly,
Carroll (2003) tells us that the principle ‘Laws of physics
should be expressed (or at least be expressible) in gener-
ally covariant form’ is ‘vacuous’.We can now identify the
‘additional assumptions’ that Stenger needs to derive
general relativity. Given general covariance (or PoVI),
the additional assumptions constitute the entire empirical
content of the theory.
Finally, general relativity provides a perfect coun-
terexample to Stenger’s conflation of covariance with
symmetry. Einstein’s GR field equation is covariant —
it takes the same form in any coordinate system,
and applying a coordinate transformation to a particular
solution of the GR equation yields another
solution, both representing the same physical scenario.
Thus, any solution of the GR equation is covariant, or
PoVI. But it does not follow that a particular
solution will exhibit any symmetries. There may be
no conserved quantities at all. As Hartle (2003, pp. 176,
342) explains:
‘Conserved quantities ycannot be expected in a
general spacetime that has no special symmetriesy
The conserved energy and angular momentum of
particle orbits in the Schwarzschild geometry7 fol-
lowed directly from its time displacement and rota-
tional symmetries. yBut general relativity does not
assume a fixed spacetime geometry. It is a theory of
spacetime geometry, and there are no symmetries that
characterize all spacetimes.’
The Standard Model of Particle Physics and Gauge
Invariance:We turn now to particle physics, and partic-
ularly the gauge principle. Interpreting gauge invariance
as ‘just a fancy technical term for point-of-view invari-
ance’, Stenger says:
‘If [the phase of the wavefunction] is allowed to vary
from point to point in space-time, Schr€odinger’s time-
dependent equation yis not gauge invariant. How-
ever, if you insert a four-vector field into the equation
and ask what that field has to be to make everything
nice and gauge invariant, that field is precisely the
four-vector potential that leads toMaxwell’s equations
of electromagnetism! That is, the electromagnetic
force turns out to be a fictitious force, like gravity,
introduced to preserve the point-of-view invariance of
the system.yMuch of the standard model of elemen-
tary particles also follows from the principle of gauge
invariance.’ (FOFT 86–88)
Remember the point that Stenger is trying to make: the
laws of nature are the same in any universe which is point-
of-view invariant.
Stenger’s discussion glosses over themajor conceptual
leap from global to local gauge invariance. Most discus-
sions of the gauge principle are rather cautious at this
point. Yang, who along with Mills first used the gauge
principle as a postulate in a physical theory, commented
that ‘We did not know how to make the theory fit
experiment. It was our judgement, however, that the
beauty of the idea alone merited attention’. Kaku (1993,
p. 11), who provides this quote, says of the argument for
local gauge invariance:
‘If the predictions of gauge theory disagreed with the
experimental data, then one would have to abandon
them, no matter how elegant or aesthetically satisfying
they were. Gauge theorists realized that the ultimate
judge of any theory was experiment.’
Similarly, Griffiths (2008) ‘knows of no compelling
physical argument for insisting that global invariance
should hold locally’ [emphasis original]. Aitchison &
Hey (2002) says that this line of thought is ‘not compel-
ling motivation’ for the step from global to local gauge
invariance, and along with Pokorski (2000), who
7
That is, the spacetime of a non-rotating, uncharged black hole.
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describes the argument as aesthetic, ultimately appeals to
the empirical success of the principle for justification.
Needless to say, these are not the views of physicists
demanding that all possible universes must obey a certain
principle8. We cannot deduce gauge invariance from
PoVI.
Even with gauge invariance, we are still a long way
from the standard model of particle physics. A gauge
theory needs a symmetry group. Electromagnetism is
based on U(1), the weak force SU(2), the strong force
SU(3), and there are grand unified theories based on
SU(5), SO(10), E8 and more. These are just the theories
with a chance of describing our universe. From a theoreti-
cal point of view, there are any number of possible
symmetries, e.g. SU(N) and SO(N) for any integer N
(Schellekens 2008). The gauge group of the standard
model, SU(3) SU(2)U(1), is far from unique.
Conclusion: We can now see the flaw in Stenger’s
argument. Premise LN1 should read: If our formulation
of the laws of nature is to be objective, then it must be
covariant. Premise LN2 should read: symmetries imply
conserved quantities. Since ‘covariant’ and ‘symmetric’
are not synonymous, it follows that the conclusion of the
argument is unproven, and we would argue that it is false.
The conservation principles of this universe are not
merely principles governing our formulation of the laws
of nature. Neother’s theorems do not allow us to pull
physically significant conclusions out of a mathematical
hat. If you want to know whether a certain symmetry
holds in nature, you need a laboratory or a telescope, not a
blackboard. Symmetries tell us something about the
physical universe.
4.1.2 Is Symmetry Enough?
Suppose that Stenger were correct regarding symme-
tries, that any objective description of the universe must
incorporate them. One of the features of the universe as we
currently understand it is that it is not perfectly symmetric.
Indeed, intelligent life requires a measure of asymmetry.
For example, the perfect homogeneity and isotropy of the
Robertson–Walker spacetime precludes the possibility of
any form of complexity, including life. Sakharov (1967)
showed that for the universe to contain sufficient amounts
of ordinary baryonic matter, interactions in the early
universe must violate baryon number conservation,
charge-symmetry and charge-parity-symmetry, and must
spend some time out of thermal equilibrium. Supersym-
metry, too, must be a broken symmetry in any life-
permitting universe, since the bosonic partner of the
electron (the selectron) would make chemistry impossible
(see the discussion in Susskind 2005, p. 250). As Pierre
Curie has said, it is asymmetry that creates a phenomena.
One of the most important concepts in modern physics
is spontaneous symmetry breaking (SSB). The power of
SSB is that it allows us
‘yto understand how the conclusions of the Noether
theorem can be evaded and how a symmetry of the
dynamics cannot be realized as a mapping of the
physical configurations of the system.’ (Strocchi
2007, p. 3)
SSB allows the laws of nature to retain their symmetry
and yet have asymmetric solutions. Even if the symme-
tries of the laws of nature were logically necessary, it
would still be an open question as to precisely which
symmetries were broken in our universe and which were
unbroken.
4.1.3 Changing the Laws of Nature
What if the laws of naturewere different? Stenger says:
‘ywhat about a universe with a different set of
‘laws’? There is not much we can say about such a
universe, nor do we need to. Not knowing what any of
their parameters are, no one can claim that they are
fine-tuned.’ (FOFT 69)
In reply, fine-tuning isn’t about what the parameters and
laws are in a particular universe. Given some other set of
laws, we ask: if a universe were chosen at random from
the set of universes with those laws, what is the prob-
ability that it would support intelligent life? If that
probability is robustly small, then we conclude that that
region of possible-physics-space contributes negligibly to
the total life-permitting subset. It is easy to find examples
of such claims.
 A universe governed by Maxwell’s Laws ‘all the way
down’ (i.e. with no quantum regime at small scales)
would not have stable atoms — electrons radiate their
kinetic energy and spiral rapidly into the nucleus—and
hence no chemistry (Barrow&Tipler 1986, p. 303).We
don’t need to know what the parameters are to know
that life in such a universe is plausibly impossible.
 If electrons were bosons, rather than fermions, then
they would not obey the Pauli exclusion principle.
There would be no chemistry.
 If gravity were repulsive rather than attractive, then
matter wouldn’t clump into complex structures.
Remember: your density, thank gravity, is 1030 times
greater than the average density of the universe.
 If the strong force were a long rather than short-range
force, then there would be no atoms. Any structures that
formed would be uniform, spherical, undifferentiated
lumps, of arbitrary size and incapable of complexity.
 If, in electromagnetism, like charges attracted and
opposites repelled, then there would be no atoms. As
above, we would just have undifferentiated lumps of
matter.
 The electromagnetic force allows matter to cool into
galaxies, stars, and planets. Without such interactions,
all matter would be like dark matter, which can only
form into large, diffuse, roughly spherical haloes of
matter whose only internal structure consists of smal-
ler, diffuse, roughly spherical subhaloes.8See also the excellent articles by Martin (2003) and Earman (2003).
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We should be cautious, however. Whatever the pro-
blems of defining the possible range of a given parameter,
we are in a significantly more nebulous realm when we
consider the set of all possible physical laws. It is not clear
how such a fine-tuning case could be formalised, what-
ever its intuitive appeal.
4.2 The Wedge
Moving from the laws of nature to the parameters those
laws, Stenger makes the following general argument
against supposed examples of fine-tuning:
‘[T]he examples of fine-tuning given in the theist
literatureyvary one parameter while holding all the
rest constant. This is both dubious and scientifically
shoddy. As we shall see in several specific cases,
changing one or more other parameters can often
compensate for the one that is changed.’ (FOFT 70)
To illustrate this point, Stenger introduces ‘thewedge’.
I have producedmy own version in Figure 1. Here, x and y
are two physical parameters that can vary from zero to
xmax and ymax, where we can allow these values to
approach infinity if so desired. The point (x0, y0) repre-
sents the values of x and y in our universe. The life-
permitting range is the shaded wedge. Stenger’s point is
that varying only one parameter at a time only explores
that part of parameter space which is vertically or hori-
zontally adjacent to (x0, y0), thus missing most of param-
eter space. The probability of a life-permitting universe,
assuming that the probability distribution is uniform in
(x, y) — which, as Stenger notes, is ‘the best we can do’
(FOFT 72)— is the ratio of the area inside the wedge to the
area inside the dashed box.
4.2.1 The Wedge is a Straw Man
In response, fine-tuning relies on a number of inde-
pendent life-permitting criteria. Fail any of these criteria,
and life becomes dramatically less likely, if not
impossible. When parameter space is explored in the
scientific literature, it rarely (if ever) looks like thewedge.
We instead see many intersecting wedges. Here are two
examples.
Barr & Khan (2007) explored the parameter space of a
model in which up-type and down-type fermions acquire
mass from different Higgs doublets. As a first step, they
vary the masses of the up and down quarks. The natural
scale for these masses ranges over 60 orders of magnitude
and is illustrated in Figure 2 (top left). The upper limit is
provided by the Planck scale; the lower limit from
dynamical breaking of chiral symmetry by QCD; see
Barr & Khan (2007) for a justification of these values.
Figure 2 (top right) zooms in on a region of parameter
space, showing boundaries of 9 independent life-
permitting criteria:
1. Above the blue line, there is only one stable element,
which consists of a single particle Dþþ. This element
has the chemistry of helium—an inert, monatomic gas
(above 4K) with no known stable chemical
compounds.
2. Above this red line, the deuteron is strongly unstable,
decaying via the strong force. The first step in stellar
nucleosynthesis in hydrogen burning stars would fail.
3. Above the green curve, neutrons in nuclei decay, so
that hydrogen is the only stable element.
4. Below this red curve, the diproton is stable9. Two
protons can fuse to helium-2 via a very fast electro-
magnetic reaction, rather than the much slower, weak
nuclear pp-chain.
5. Above this red line, the production of deuterium in
stars absorbs energy rather than releasing it. Also, the
deuterium is unstable to weak decay.
6. Below this red line, a proton in a nucleus can capture
an orbiting electron and become a neutron. Thus,
atoms are unstable.
7. Below the orange curve, isolated protons are unstable,
leaving no hydrogen left over from the early universe
Δ
Figure 1 The ‘wedge’: x and y are two physical parameters that
can vary up to some xmax and ymax, where we can allow these values
to approach infinity if so desired. The point (x0, y0) represents the
values of x and y in our universe. The life-permitting range is the
shaded wedge. Varying only one parameter at a time only explores
that part of parameter space which is vertically or horizontally
adjacent to (x0, y0), thus missing most of parameter space.
9
This may not be as clear-cut a disaster as is often asserted in the fine-
tuning literature, going back to Dyson (1971). MacDonald & Mullan
(2009) and Bradford (2009) have shown that the binding of the diproton
is not sufficient to burn all the hydrogen to helium in big bang
nucleosynthesis. For example, MacDonald & Mullan (2009) show that
while an increase in the strength of the strong force by 13%will bind the
diproton, a,50% increase is needed to significantly affect the amount of
hydrogen left over for stars. Also, Collins (2003) has noted that the decay
of the diproton will happen too slowly for the resulting deuteron to be
converted into helium, leaving at least some deuterium to power stars
and take the place of hydrogen in organic compounds. Finally with
regard to stars, Phillips (1999, p. 118) notes that: ‘It is sometimes
suggested that the timescale for hydrogen burning would be shorter if
it were initiated by an electromagnetic reaction instead of the weak
nuclear reaction [as would be the case is the diproton were bound]. This
is not the case, because the overall rate for hydrogen burning is
determined by the rate at which energy can escape from the star,
i.e. by its opacity, If hydrogen burning were initiated by an electromag-
netic reaction, this reaction would proceed at about the same rate as the
weak reaction, but at a lower temperature and density.’ However, stars in
such a universe would be significantly different to our own, and detailed
predictions for their formation and evolution have not been investigated.
536 L. A. Barnes
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1071/AS12015
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 15:57:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
to power long-lived stars and play a crucial role in
organic chemistry.
8. Below this green curve, protons in nuclei decay, so that
any atoms that formed would disintegrate into a cloud
of neutrons.
9. Below this blue line, the only stable element consists
of a single particle D, which can combine with a
positron to produce an element with the chemistry of
hydrogen. A handful of chemical reactions are possi-
ble, with their most complex product being (an ana-
logue of) H2.
A second example comes from cosmology. Figure 2
(bottom row) comes from Tegmark et al. (2006). It shows
the life-permitting range for two slices through cosmo-
logical parameter space. The parameters shown are: the
cosmological constant L (expressed as an energy density
rL in Planck units), the amplitude of primordial fluctua-
tions Q, and the matter to photon ratio x. A star indicates
the location of our universe, and the white region shows
where life can form. The left panel shows rL vs. Q
3x4.
The red region shows universes that are plausibly life-
prohibiting — too far to the right and no cosmic structure
“potentially
viable”
Figure 2 Top row: the left panel shows the parameter space of the masses of the up and down quark. Note that the axes are loge not log10; the
axes span ,60 orders of magnitude. The right panel shows a zoom-in of the small box. The lines show the limits of different life-permitting
criteria, as calculated byBarr &Khan (2007) and explained in the text. The small green regionmarked ‘potentially viable’ showswhere all these
constraints are satisfied. Bottom row: Anthropic limits on some cosmological variables: the cosmological constant L (expressed as an energy
density rL in Planck units), the amplitude of primordial fluctuationsQ, and the matter to photon ratio x. The white region shows where life can
form. The coloured regions show where various life-permitting criteria are not fulfilled, as explained in the text. Figure from Tegmark et al.
(2006). Figures reprinted with permission; Copyright (2006, 2007) by the American Physical Society.
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forms; stray too low and cosmic structures are not dense
enough to form stars and planets; too high and cosmic
structures are too dense to allow long-lived stable plane-
tary systems. Note well the logarithmic scale — the lack
of a left boundary to the life-permitting region is because
we have scaled the axis so that rL¼ 0 is at x¼N. The
universe re-collapses before life can form for rLt
10121 (Peacock 2007). The right panel shows similar
constraints in theQ vs. x space.We see similar constraints
relating to the ability of galaxies to successfully form stars
by fragmentation due to gas cooling and for the universe
to form anything other than black holes. Note that we are
changing xwhile holding xbaryon constant, so the left limit
of the plot is provided by the condition x$ xbaryon. See
Table 4 of Tegmark et al. (2006) for a summary of
8 anthropic constraints on the 7 dimensional parameter
space (a, b, mp, rL, Q, x, xbaryon).
Examples could be multiplied, and the restriction to a
2D slice through parameter space is due to the inconve-
nient unavailability of higher dimensional paper. These
two examples show that the wedge, by only considering a
single life-permitting criterion, seriously distorts typical
cases of fine-tuning by committing the sequential juggler
fallacy (Section 2). Stenger further distorts the case for
fine-tuning by saying:
‘In the fine-tuning view, there is no wedge and the
point has infinitesimal area, so the probability of
finding life is zero.’ (FOFT 70)
No reference is given, and this statement is not true of the
scientific literature. The wedge is a straw man.
4.2.2 The Straw Man is Winning
The wedge, distortion that it is, would still be able
to support a fine-tuning claim. The probability calculated
by varying only one parameter is actually an overestimate
of the probability calculated using the full wedge. Sup-
pose the full life-permitting criterion that defines the
wedge is,
1   y=x
y0=x0
 1þ ; ð2Þ
where  is a small number quantifying the allowed devi-
ation from the value of y/x in our universe. Now suppose
that we hold x constant at its value in our universe. We
conservatively estimate the possible range of y by y0.
Then, the probability of a life-permitting universe is
Py¼ 2. Now, if we calculate the probability over the
whole wedge, we find that Pw# /(1þ )E , where we
have an upper limit because we have ignored the area with
y inside Dy, as marked in Figure 1. Thus10 Py$Pw.
It is thus not necessarily ‘scientifically shoddy’ to vary
only one variable. Indeed, as scientists we must make
these kind of assumptions all the time — the question is
how accurate they are. Under fairly reasonable assump-
tions (uniform probability etc.), varying only one variable
provides a useful estimate of the relevant probability. The
wedge thus commits the flippant funambulist fallacy
(Section 2). If  is small enough, then the wedge is a
tightrope. We have opened up more parameter space in
which life can form, but we have also opened up more
parameter space in which life cannot form. As Dawkins
(1986) has rightly said: ‘however many ways there may
be of being alive, it is certain that there are vastly more
ways of being dead, or rather not alive’.
This conclusion might be avoided with a non-uniform
prior probability. One can show that a power-law prior has
no significant effect on thewedge. Any other prior raises a
problem, as explained by Aguirre (2007):
‘yit is assumed that [the prior] is either flat or a simple
power law, without any complicated structure. This
can be done just for simplicity, but it is often argued to
be natural. yIf [the prior] is to have an interesting
structure over the relatively small range in which
observers are abundant, there must be a parameter of
order the observed [one] in the expression for [the
prior]. But it is precisely the absence of this parameter
that motivated the anthropic approach.’
In short, to significantly change the probability of a life-
permitting universe, we would need a prior that centres
close to the observed value, and has a narrow peak. But
this simply exchanges one fine-tuning for two — the
centre and peak of the distribution.
There is, however, one important lesson to be drawn
from the wedge. If we vary x only and calculate Px, and
then vary y only and calculate Py, we must not simply
multiplyPw¼Px Py. This will certainly underestimate the
probability inside the wedge, assuming that there is only a
single wedge.
4.3 Entropy
We turn now to cosmology. The problem of the appar-
ently low entropy of the universe is one of the oldest
problems of cosmology. The fact that the entropy of the
universe is not at its theoretical maximum, coupled with
the fact that entropy cannot decrease, means that the
universe must have started in a very special, low entropy
state. Stenger argues in response that if the universe starts
out at the Planck time as a sphere of radius equal to the
Planck length, then its entropy is as great as it could
possibly be, equal to that of a Planck-sized black hole
(Bekenstein 1973; Hawking 1975). As the universe
expands, an entropy ‘gap’ between the actual and maxi-
mum entropy opens up in regions smaller than the
observable universe, allowing order to form.
Note that Stenger’s proposed solution requires only
two ingredients — the initial, high-entropy state, and the
expansion of the universe to create an entropy gap. In
particular, Stenger is not appealing to inflation to solve
10
Note that this is independent of xmax and ymax, and in particular holds
in the limit xmax, ymax-N.
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the entropy problem. We will do the same in this section,
coming to a discussion of inflation later.
There are a number of problems with Stenger’s argu-
ment, the most severe of which arises even if we assume
that his calculation is correct. We have been asked to
consider the universe at the Planck time, and in particular
a region of the universe that is the size of the Planck
length. Let’s see what happens to this comoving volume
as the universe expands. 13.7 billion years of (concor-
dance model) expansion will blow up this Planck volume
until it is roughly the size of a grain of sand. A single
Planck volume in a maximum entropy state at the Planck
time is a good start but hardly sufficient. To make our
universe, we would need around 1090 such Planck
volumes, all arranged to transition to a classical expand-
ing phase within a temporal window 100 000 times
shorter than the Planck time11. This brings us to the most
serious problem with Stenger’s reply.
Let’s remind ourselves of what the entropy problem is,
as expounded by Penrose (1979). Consider our universe at
t1¼ one second after the big bang. Spacetime is remark-
ably smooth, represented by the Robertson-Walkermetric
to better than one part in 105. Now run the clock forward.
The tiny inhomogeneities grow under gravity, forming
deeper and deeper potential wells. Somewill collapse into
black holes, creating singularities in our once pristine
spacetime. Now suppose that the universe begins to
recollapse. Unless the collapse of the universe were
to reverse the arrow of time12, entropy would continue
to increase, creatingmore and larger inhomogeneities and
black holes as structures collapse and collide. If we freeze
the universe at t2¼ one second before the big crunch, we
see a spacetime that is highly inhomogeneous, littered
with lumps and bumps, and pockmarked with
singularities.
Penrose’s reasoning is very simple. If we started at
t1 with an extremely homogeneous spacetime, and then
allowed a few billion years of entropy increasing
processes to take their toll, and ended at t2 with an
extremely inhomogeneous spacetime, full of black holes,
then we must conclude that the t2 spacetime represents a
significantly higher entropy state than the t1 spacetime.
We conclude that we know what a high-entropy big bang
spacetime looks like, and it looks nothing like the state of
our universe in its earliest stages.Why didn’t our universe
begin in a high entropy, highly inhomogeneous state?
Why did our universe start off in such a special, improb-
able, low-entropy state?
Let’s return to Stenger’s proposed solution. After
introducing the relevant concepts, he says:
‘ythis does not mean that the local entropy is maxi-
mal. The entropy density of the universe can be
calculated. Since the universe is homogeneous, it will
be the same on all scales.’ (FOFT 112)
Stenger simply assumes that the universe is homoge-
neous and isotropic. We can see this also in his use of
the Friedmann equation, which assumes that spacetime is
homogeneous and isotropic. Not surprisingly, once
homogeneity and isotropy have been assumed, the
entropy problem doesn’t seem so hard.
We conclude that Stenger has failed to solve the
entropy problem. He has presented the problem itself as
its solution. Homogeneous, isotropic expansion cannot
solve the entropy problem — it is the entropy problem.
Stenger’s assertion that ‘the universe starts out with
maximum entropy or complete disorder’ is false. A
homogeneous, isotropic spacetime is an incredibly low
entropy state. Penrose (1989) warned of precisely this
brand of failed solution two decades ago:
‘Virtually all detailed investigations [of entropy and
cosmology] so far have taken the FRWmodels as their
starting point, which, as we have seen, totally begs the
question of the enormous number of degrees of free-
dom available in the gravitational fieldyThe second
law of thermodynamics arises because there was an
enormous constraint (of a very particular kind) placed
on the universe at the beginning of time, giving us the
very low entropy that we need in order to start
things off.’
Cosmologists repented of such mistakes in the 1970’s
and 80’s.
Stenger’s ‘biverse’ (FOFT 142) doesn’t solve the
entropy problem either. Once again, homogeneity and
isotropy are simply assumed, with the added twist that
instead of a low entropy initial state, we have a low
entropy middle state. This makes no difference — the
reason that a low entropy state requires explanation is that
it is improbable. Moving the improbable state into the
middle does not make it any more probable. As Carroll
(2008) notes, ‘an unnatural low-entropy condition [that
occurs] in the middle of the universe’s history (at the
bounce) ypasses the buck on the question of why the
entropy near what we call the big bang was small’.13
11
This requirement is set by the homogeneity of our universe. Regions
that transition early will expand and dilute, and so for the entire universe
to be homogeneous to within QE 105, the regions must begin their
classical phase within DtEQt.
12
This seems very unlikely. Regions of the universe which have
collapsed and virialised have decoupled from the overall expansion of
the universe, and so would have no way of knowing exactly when the
expansion stalled and reversed. However, as Price (1997) lucidly
explains, such arguments risk invoking a double standard, as they work
just as well when applied backwards in time.
13
Carroll has raised this objection to Stenger (FOFT 142), whose reply
was to point out that the arrow of time always points away from the
lowest entropy point, so we can always call that point the beginning of
the universe. Once again, Stenger fails to understand the problem. The
question is not why the low entropy state was at the beginning
of the universe, but why the universe was ever in a low entropy state.
The second law of thermodynamics tells us that the most probable world
is one in which the entropy is always high. This is precisely what entropy
quantifies. See Price (1997, 2006) for an excellent discussion of these
issues.
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4.4 Inflation
4.4.1 Did Inflation Happen?
We turn now to cosmic inflation, which proposes that
the universe underwent a period of accelerated expansion
in its earliest stages. The achievements of inflation are
truly impressive — in one fell swoop, the universe is sent
on its expandingway, the flatness, horizon, andmonopole
problem are solved and we have concrete, testable and
seemingly correct predictions for the origin of cosmic
structure. It is a brilliant idea, and one that continues to
defy all attempts at falsification. Since life requires an
almost-flat universe (Barrow & Tipler 1986, p. 408ff.),
inflation is potentially a solution to a particularly impres-
sive fine-tuning problem—sans inflation, the density of a
life-permitting universe at the Planck time must be tuned
to 60 decimal places.
Inflation solves this fine-tuning problem by invoking a
dynamical mechanism that drives the universe towards
flatness. The first question we must ask is: did inflation
actually happen? The evidence is quite strong, though not
indubitable (Turok 2002; Brandenberger 2011). There are
a few things to keep in mind. Firstly, inflation isn’t a
specific model as such; it is a family of models which
share the desirable trait of having an early epoch of
accelerating expansion. Inflation is an effect, rather than
a cause. There is no physical theory that predicts the form
of the inflaton potential. Different potentials, and differ-
ent initial conditions for the same potential, will produce
different predictions.
While there are predictions shared by a wide variety of
inflationary potentials, these predictions are not unique to
inflation. Inflation predicts a Gaussian random field of
density fluctuations, but thanks to the central limit theo-
rem this isn’t particularly unique (Peacock 1999, p. 342,
503). Inflation predicts a nearly scale-invariant spectrum
of fluctuations, but such a spectrum was proposed for
independent reasons by Harrison (1970) and Zel’dovich
(1972) a decade before inflationwas proposed. Inflation is
a clever solution of the flatness and horizon problem, but
could be rendered unnecessary by a quantum-gravity
theory of initial conditions. The evidence for inflation is
impressive but circumstantial.
4.4.2 Can Inflation Explain Fine-Tuning?
Note the difference between this section and the last. Is
inflation itself fine-tuned? This is no mere technicality—
if the solution is just as fine-tuned as the problem, then no
progress has been made. Inflation, to set up a life-
permitting universe, must do the following14:
I1. There must be an inflaton field. To make the expan-
sion of the universe accelerate, theremust exist a form
of energy (a field) capable of satisfying the so-called
SlowRoll Approximation (SRA), which is equivalent
to requiring that the potential energy of the field is
much greater than its kinetic energy, giving the field
negative pressure.
I2. Inflation must start. There must come a time in the
history of the universe when the energy density of
the inflaton field dominates the total energy density of
the universe, dictating its dynamics.
I3. Inflation must last. While the inflaton field controls
the dynamics of the expansion of the universe, we
need it to obey the slow roll conditions for a suffi-
ciently long period of time. The ‘amount of inflation’
is usually quantified by Ne, the number of e-folds of
the size of the universe. To solve the horizon and
flatness problems, this number must be greater than
,60.
I4. Inflation must end. The dynamics of the expansion of
the universe will (if it expands forever) eventually be
dominated by the energy component with the most
negative equation of state w¼ pressure/energy
density. Matter has w¼ 0, radiation w¼ 1/3, and
typically during inflation, the inflaton field has
wE1. Thus, once inflation takes over, there must
be some special reason for it to stop; otherwise, the
universe would maintain its exponential expansion
and no complex structure would form.
I5. Inflationmust end in the right way. Inflationwill have
exponentially diluted the mass-energy density of the
universe — it is this feature that allows inflation to
solve the monopole problem. Once we are done
inflating the universe, we must reheat the universe,
i.e. refill it with ordinary matter. We must also ensure
that the post-inflation field doesn’t possess a large,
negative potential energy, which would cause the
universe to quickly recollapse.
I6. Inflation must set up the right density perturbations.
Inflation must result in a universe that is very homo-
geneous, but not perfectly homogeneous. Inhomoge-
neities will grow via gravitational instability to form
cosmic structures. The level of inhomogeneity (Q) is
subject to anthropic constraints, which we will dis-
cuss in Section 4.5.
The question now is: which of these achievements
come naturally to inflation, and which need some careful
tuning of the inflationary dials? I1 is a bare hypothesis —
we know of no deeper reason why there should be an
inflaton field at all. It was hoped that the inflaton field
could be the Higgs field (Guth 1981). Alas, it wasn’t to be,
and it appears that the inflaton’s sole raison d’eˆtre is to
cause the universe’s expansion to briefly accelerate.
There is no direct evidence for the existence of the
inflaton field.
We can understand many of the remaining conditions
through the work of Tegmark (2005), who considered a
wide range of inflaton potentials using Gaussian random
fields. The potential is of the form V(f)¼mv4 f(f/mh),
where mv and mh are the characteristic vertical and
horizontal mass scales, and f is a dimensionless function
with values and derivatives of order unity. For initial
14
These requirements can be found in any good cosmology textbook,
e.g. Peacock (1999); Mo, van den Bosch & White (2010).
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conditions, Tegmark ‘sprays starting points randomly
across the potential surface’. Figure 3 shows a typical
inflaton potential.
Requirement I2 will be discussed inmore detail below.
For now we note that the inflaton must either begin or be
driven into a region in which the SRA holds in order for
the universe to inflate, as shown by the thick lines in
Figure 3.
Requirement I3 comes rather naturally to inflation:
Peacock (1999, p. 337) shows that the requirement that
inflation produce a large number of e-folds is essentially
the same as the requirement that inflation happen in the
first place (i.e. SRA), namely fstartcmPl. This assumes
that the potential is relatively smooth, and that inflation
terminates at a value of the field (f) rather smaller than its
value at the start. There is another problem lurking,
however. If inflation lasts for \70 e-folds (for GUT
scale inflation), then all scales inside the Hubble radius
today started out with physical wavelength smaller
than the Planck scale at the beginning of inflation
(Brandenberger 2011). The predictions of inflation (espe-
cially the spectrum of perturbations), which use general
relativity and a semi-classical description of matter, must
omit relevant quantum gravitational physics. This is a
major unknown — transplanckian effects may even
prevent the onset of inflation.
I4 is non-trivial. The inflaton potential (or, more
specifically, the region of the inflaton potential which
actually determines the evolution of the field) must have a
region in which the slow-roll approximation does not
hold. If the inflaton rolls into a local minimum (at f0)
while the SRA still holds (which requires V(f0)cmPl
2 /
8p d2V/df29f0 Peacock 1999, p. 332), then inflation never
ends.
Tegmark (2005) asks what fraction of initial condi-
tions for the inflaton field are successful, where success
means that the universe inflates, inflation ends and the
universes doesn’t thereafter meet a swift demise via a big
crunch. The result is shown in Figure 4.
The thick black line shows the ‘success rate’ of infla-
tion, for a model with mh/mPl as shown on the x-axis and
mv¼ 0.001mPl. (This value has been chosen to maximise
the probability that Q¼QobservedE 2 105). The
coloured curves show predictions for other cosmological
parameters. The lower coloured regions are for mv¼
0.001mPl; the upper coloured regions are for mv¼mh.
The success rate peaks at,0.1 percent, and drops rapidly
as mh increases or decreases away from mPl. Even with a
scalar field, inflation is far from guaranteed.
If inflation ends, we need its energy to be converted
into ordinary matter (Condition I5). Inflation must not
result in a universe filled with pure radiation or dark
matter, which cannot form complex structures. Typically,
the inflaton will to dump its energy into radiation. The
temperature must be high enough to take advantage of
baryon-number-violating physics for baryogenesis, and
for gþ g- particleþ antiparticle reactions to create
baryonic matter, but low enough not to create magnetic
monopoles. With no physical model of the inflaton, the
necessary coupling between the inflaton and ordinary
matter/radiation is another postulate, but not an implausi-
ble one.

Figure 3 An example of a randomly-generated inflaton potential.
Thick lines show where the Slow Roll Approximation holds (SRA);
thin lines show where it fails. The stars show four characteristic
initial conditions. Three-pointed: the inflaton starts outside the SRA
regions and does not re-enter, so there is no inflation. Four-pointed:
successful inflation. Inflationwill have a beginning, and end, and the
post-inflationary vacuum energy is sufficiently small to allow the
growth of structure. Five-pointed: inflation occurs, but the post-
inflation field has a large, negative potential energy, which would
cause the universe to quickly recollapse. Six-pointed: inflation never
ends, and the universe contains no ordinary matter and no structure.
Figure from Tegmark (2005), reproduced with permission of IOP
Publishing Ltd.
Figure 4 The thick black line shows the ‘success rate’ of inflation,
for a model with mh/mPl as shown on the x-axis and mv¼ 0.001mPl.
(This value has been chosen to maximise the probability of Q¼
QobservedE 2 105). The success rate is at most,0.1%. The other
coloured curves show predictions for other cosmological para-
meters. The lower coloured regions are formv¼ 0.001mPl; the upper
coloured regions are for mv¼mh. Figure adapted from Tegmark
(2005), reproduced with permission of IOP Publishing Ltd.
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Requirement I6 brought about the downfall of ‘old’
inflation. When this version of inflation ended, it did so in
expanding bubbles. Each bubble is too small to account
for the homogeneity of the observed universe, and reheat-
ing only occurs when bubbles collide. As the space
between the bubbles is still inflating, homogeneity cannot
be achieved. New models of inflation have been devel-
oped which avoid this problem.More generally, the value
of Q that results from inflation depends on the potential
and initial conditions. We will discuss Q further in
Section 4.5.
Perhaps themost pressing issuewith inflation is hidden
in requirement I2. Inflation is supposed to provide a
dynamical explanation for the seemingly very fine-tuned
initial conditions of the standardmodel of cosmology. But
does inflation need special initial conditions? Can infla-
tion act on generic initial conditions and produce the
apparently fine-tuned universe we observe today?
Hollands & Wald (2002b)15 contend not, for the follow-
ing reason. Consider a collapsing universe. It would
require an astonishing sequence of correlations and coin-
cidences for the universe, in its final stages, to suddenly
and coherently convert all its matter into a scalar field
with just enough kinetic energy to roll to the top of its
potential and remain perfectly balanced there for long
enough to cause a substantial era of ‘deflation’. The
region of final-condition-space that results from deflation
is thus much smaller than the region that does not result
from deflation. Since the relevant physics is time-
reversible16, we can simply run the tape backwards and
conclude that the initial-condition-space is dominated by
universes that fail to inflate.
Readers will note the similarity of this argument to
Penrose’s argument from Section 4.3. This intuitive
argument can be formalised using the work of Gibbons,
Hawking & Stewart (1987), who developed the canonical
measure on the set of solutions of Einstein’s equation of
General Relativity. A number of authors have used the
Gibbons–Hawking–Stewart canonical measure to calcu-
late the probability of inflation; see Hawking & Page
(1988), Gibbons & Turok (2008) and references therein.
We will summarise the work of Carroll & Tam (2010),
who ask what fraction of universes that evolve like our
universe sincematter-radiation equality could have begun
with inflation. Crucially, they consider the role played by
perturbations:
Perturbations must be sub-dominant if inflation is to
begin in the first place (Vachaspati & Trodden 1999),
and by the end of inflation only small quantum
fluctuations in the energy density remain. It is
therefore a necessary (although not sufficient) condi-
tion for inflation to occur that perturbations be small at
early times.ythe fraction of realistic cosmologies that
are eligible for inflation is therefore P(inflation)E
106.610
7
.
Carroll & Tam casually note: ‘This is a small number’,
and in fact an overestimate. A negligibly small fraction of
universes that resemble ours at late times experience an
early period of inflation. Carroll & Tam (2010) conclude
that while inflation is not without its attractions (e.g. it
may give a theory of initial conditions a slightly easier
target to hit at the Planck scale), ‘inflation by itself cannot
solve the horizon problem, in the sense of making the
smooth early universe a natural outcome of a wide variety
of initial conditions’. Note that this argument also shows
that inflation, in and of itself, cannot solve the entropy
problem17.
Let’s summarise. Inflation is a wonderful idea; in
many ways it seems irresistible (Liddle 1995). However,
we do not have a physical model, and even we had such a
model, ‘although inflationary models may alleviate the
‘fine tuning’ in the choice of initial conditions, the models
themselves create new ‘fine tuning’ issues with regard to
the properties of the scalar field’ (Hollands & Wald
2002b). To pretend that the mere mention of inflation
makes a life-permitting universe ‘100 percent’ inevitable
(FOFT 245) is naı¨ve in the extreme, a cane toad solution.
For a popular-level discussion of many of the points
raised in our discussion of inflation, see Steinhardt
(2011).
4.4.3 Inflation as a Case Study
Suppose that inflation did solve the fine-tuning of the
density of the universe. Is it reasonable to hope that all
fine-tuning cases could be solved in a similar way? We
contend not, because inflation has a target. Let’s consider
the range of densities that the universe could have had at
some point in its early history. One of these densities is
physically singled out as special — the critical density18.
Now let’s note the range of densities that permit the
existence of cosmic structure in a long-lived universe.
We find that this range is very narrow. Very conveniently,
this range neatly straddles the critical density.
We can now see why inflation has a chance. There is in
fact a three-fold coincidence —A: the density needed for
life, B: the critical density, and C: the actual density of our
universe are all aligned. B and C are physical parameters,
and so it is possible that some physical process can bring
the two into agreement. The coincidence betweenA andB
15
See also the discussion in Kofman, Linde & Mukhanov (2002) and
Hollands & Wald (2002a)
16
Cosmic phase transitions are irreversible in the same sense that
scrambling an egg is irreversible. The time asymmetry is a consequence
of low entropy initial conditions, not the physics itself (Penrose 1989;
Hollands & Wald 2002a).
17
We should also note that Carroll&Tam (2010) argue that theGibbons-
Hawking-Stewart canonical measure renders an inflationary solution to
the flatness problem superfluous. This is a puzzling result — it would
seem to show that non-flat FLRW universes are infinitely unlikely, so to
speak. This result has been noted before. See Gibbons & Turok (2008)
for a different point of view.
18
We use the Hubble constant to specify the particular time being
considered.
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then creates the required anthropic coincidence (A andC).
If, for example, life required a universe with a density
(say, just after reheating) 10 times less than critical, then
inflation would do a wonderful job of making all uni-
verses uninhabitable.
Inflation thus represents a very special case. Waiting
inside the life-permitting range (L) is another physical
parameter (p). Aim for p and you will get L thrown in for
free. This is not true of the vast majority of fine-tuning
cases. There is no known physical scalewaiting in the life-
permitting range of the quark masses, fundamental force
strengths or the dimensionality of spacetime. There can be
no inflation-like dynamical solution to these fine-tuning
problems because dynamical processes are blind to the
requirements of intelligent life.
What if, unbeknownst to us, there was such a
fundamental parameter? It would need to fall into the
life-permitting range. As such, we would be solving a
fine-tuning problem by creating at least onemore. Andwe
would also need to posit a physical process able to
dynamically drive the value of the quantity in our universe
toward p.
4.5 The Amplitude of Primordial Fluctuations Q
Q, the amplitude of primordial fluctuations, is one of
Martin Rees’ Just Six Numbers. In our universe, its value
is QE 2 105, meaning that in the early universe the
density at any point was typically within 1 part in 100 000
of the mean density. What if Q were different?
‘If Q were smaller than 106, gas would never con-
dense into gravitationally bound structures at all, and
such a universe would remain forever dark and fea-
tureless, even if its initial ‘mix’ of atoms, dark energy
and radiation were the same as our own. On the other
hand, a universe where Q were substantially larger
than 105—were the initial ‘ripples’ were replaced by
large-amplitude waves — would be a turbulent and
violent place. Regions far bigger than galaxies would
condense early in its history. They wouldn’t fragment
into stars but would instead collapse into vast black
holes, each much heavier than an entire cluster of
galaxies in our universe yStars would be packed
too close together and buffeted too frequently to retain
stable planetary systems.’ (Rees 1999, p. 115)
Stenger has two replies:
‘[T]he inflationary model predicted that the deviation
from smoothness should be one part in 100 000. This
prediction was spectacularly verified by the Cosmic
Background Explorer (COBE) in 1992.’ (FOFT 106)
‘While heroic attempts by the best minds in cosmology
have not yet succeeded in calculating the magnitude of
Q, inflation theory successfully predicted the angular
correlation across the sky that has been observed.’
(FOFT 206)
Note that the first part of the quote contradicts the
second part. We are first told that inflation predicts
Q¼ 105, and then we are told that inflation cannot
predict Q at all. Both claims are false. A given inflation-
ary model will predict Q, and it will only predict a life-
permitting value for Q if the parameters of the inflaton
potential are suitably fine-tuned. As Turok (2002) notes,
‘to obtain density perturbations of the level required by
observations ywe need to adjust the coupling m [for a
power law potential mfn] to be very small, ,1013 in
Planck units. This is the famous fine-tuning problem of
inflation’; see also Barrow & Tipler (1986, p. 437) and
Brandenberger (2011). Rees’ life-permitting range for Q
implies a fine-tuning of the inflaton potential of ,1011
with respect to the Planck scale. Tegmark (2005, partic-
ularly figure 11) argues that on very general grounds we
can conclude that life-permitting inflation potentials are
highly unnatural.
Stenger’s second reply is to ask,
‘yis an order of magnitude fine-tuning? Furthermore,
Rees, as he admits, is assuming all other parameters are
unchanged. In the first case where Q is too small to
cause gravitational clumping, increasing the strength
of gravity would increase the clumping. Now, as we
have seen, the dimensionless strength of gravity aG is
arbitrarily defined. However, gravity is stronger when
the masses involved are greater. So the parameter that
would vary along with Q would be the nucleon mass.
As for larger Q, it seems unlikely that inflation would
ever result in large fluctuations, given the extensive
smoothing that goes on during exponential expansion.’
(FOFT 207)
There are a few problems here. We have a clear case of
the flippant funambulist fallacy — the possibility of
altering other constants to compensate the change in
Q is not evidence against fine-tuning. Choose Q and,
say, aG at random and you are unlikely to have picked a
life-permitting pair, even if our universe is not the only
life-permitting one. We also have a nice example of the
cheap-binoculars fallacy. The allowed change in Q rela-
tive to its value in our universe (‘an order of magnitude’)
is necessarily an underestimate of the degree of fine-
tuning. The question is whether this range is small
compared to the possible range of Q. Stenger seems to
see this problem, and so argues that large values of Q are
unlikely to result from inflation. This claim is false19. The
upper blue region of Figure 4 shows the distribution of Q
for the model of Tegmark (2005), using the ‘physically
natural expectation’mv¼mh. Themean value ofQ ranges
from 10 to almost 10 000.
Note that Rees only varies Q in ‘Just Six Numbers’
because it is a popular level book. He and many others
19
The Arxiv version of this paper (arxiv.org/abs/1112.4647) includes an
appendix that gives further critique of Stenger’s discussion of
cosmology.
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have extensively investigated the effect on structure
formation of altering a number of cosmological para-
meters, including Q.
Tegmark & Rees (1998) were the first to calculate the
range of Q which permits life, deriving the following
limits for the case where rL¼ 0:
a1 lnða2Þ16=9 aG bx
 4=3
O2=3b tQt a16=7a4=7G b12=7;
ð3Þ
where these quantities are defined in Table 1, except for
the cosmic baryon density parameter Ob, and we have
omitted geometric factors of order unity. This inequality
demonstrates the variety of physical phenomena, atomic,
gravitational and cosmological, that must combine in the
right way in order to produce a life-permitting universe.
Tegmark & Rees also note that there is some freedom to
change Q and rL together.
Tegmark et al. (2006) expanded on this work, looking
more closely at the role of the cosmological constant. We
have already seen some of the results from this paper in
Section 4.2.1. The paper considers 8 anthropic constraints
on the 7 dimensional parameter space (a, b, mp, rL, Q, x,
xbaryon). Figure 2 (bottom row) shows that the life-
permitting region is boxed-in on all sides. In particular,
the freedom to increaseQ and rL together is limited by the
life-permitting range of galaxy densities.
Bousso et al. (2009) considers the 4-dimensional
parameter space (b, Q, Teq, rL), where Teq is the temper-
ature if the CMB at matter-radiation equality. They reach
similar conclusions to Rees et al.; see also Garriga et al.
(1999); Bousso & Leichenauer (2009, 2010).
Garriga & Vilenkin (2006) discuss what they call the
‘Q catastrophe’: the probability distribution forQ across a
multiverse typically increases or decreases sharply
through the anthropic window. Thus, we expect that the
observed value ofQ is very likely to be close to one of the
boundaries of the life-permitting range. The fact that we
appear to be in the middle of the range leads Garriga &
Vilenkin to speculate that the life-permitting range may
be narrower than Tegmark & Rees (1998) calculated. For
example, there may be a tighter upper bound due to the
perturbation of comets by nearby stars and/or the problem
of nearby supernovae explosions.
The interested reader is referred to the 90 scientific
papers which cite Tegmark & Rees (1998), catalogued on
the NASA Astrophysics Data System20.
The fine-tuning of Q stands up well under
examination.
4.6 Cosmological Constant L
The cosmological constant problem is described in the
textbook of Burgess & Moore (2006) as ‘arguably the
most severe theoretical problem in high-energy physics
today, as measured by both the difference between
observations and theoretical predictions, and by the lack
of convincing theoretical ideas which address it’. A well-
understood andwell-tested theory of fundamental physics
(Quantum Field Theory—QFT) predicts contributions to
the vacuum energy of the universe that are ,10120 times
greater than the observed total value. Stenger’s reply is
guided by the following principle:
‘Any calculation that disagrees with the data by 50 or
120 orders of magnitude is simply wrong and should
not be taken seriously. We just have to await the
correct calculation.’ (FOFT 219)
This seems indistinguishable from reasoning that the
calculation must be wrong since otherwise the cosmo-
logical constant would have to be fine-tuned. One could
not hope for a more perfect example of begging the
question. More importantly, there is a misunderstanding
in Stenger’s account of the cosmological constant prob-
lem. The problem is not that physicists have made an
incorrect prediction. We can use the term dark energy
for any form of energy that causes the expansion of the
universe to accelerate, including a ‘bare’ cosmological
constant (see Barnes et al. 2005, for an introduction to
dark energy). Cosmological observations constrain the
total dark energy. QFT allows us to calculate a number
of contributions to the total dark energy from matter
fields in the universe. Each of these contributions turns
out to be 10120 times larger than the total. There is no
direct theory-vs.-observation contradiction as one is
calculating and measuring different things. The fine-
tuning problem is that these different independent con-
tributions, including perhaps some that we don’t know
about, manage to cancel each other to such an alarming,
life-permitting degree. This is not a straightforward case
of Popperian falsification.
Stenger outlines a number of attempts to explain the
fine-tuning of the cosmological constant.
Supersymmetry: Supersymmetry, if it holds in our
universe, would cancel out some of the contributions to
the vacuum energy, reducing the required fine-tuning to
one part in,1050. Stenger admits the obvious— this isn’t
an entirely satisfying solution — but there is a deeper
reason to be sceptical of the idea that advances in particle
physics could solve the cosmological constant problem.
As Bousso (2008) explains:
ynongravitational physics depends only on energy
differences, so the standard model cannot respond to
the actual value of the cosmological constant it
sources. This implies that rL¼ 0 [i.e. zero cosmologi-
cal constant] is not a special value from the particle
physics point of view.
A particle physics solution to the cosmological constant
problem would be just as significant a coincidence as the
cosmological constant problem itself. Further, this is not a20http://TegRees.notlong.com
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problem that appears only at the Planck scale. It is thus
unlikely that quantum gravity will solve the problem. For
example, Donoghue (2007) says
‘It is unlikely that there is technically natural resolu-
tion to the cosmological constant’s fine-tuning
problem — this would require new physics at
103 eV. [Such attempts are] highly contrived to have
new dynamics at this extremely low scale which
modifies only gravity and not the other interactions.’
Zero Cosmological Constant: Stenger tries to show that
the cosmological constant of general relativity should be
defined to be zero. He says:
‘Only in general relativity, where gravity depends on
mass/energy, does an absolute value of mass/energy
have any consequence. So general relativity (or a
quantum theory of gravity) is the only place where
we can set an absolute zero of mass/ energy. It makes
sense to define zero energy as the situation inwhich the
source of gravity, the energy momentum tensor, and
the cosmological constant are each zero.’
The second sentence contradicts the first. If gravity
depends on the absolute value of mass/energy, then we
cannot set the zero-level to our convenience. It is in
particle physics, where gravity is ignorable, where we
are free to define ‘zero’ energy as we like. In general
relativity there is no freedom to redefine L. The cosmo-
logical constant has observable consequences that no
amount of redefinition can disguise.
Stenger’s argument fails because of this premise: if
(Tmn¼ 0.Gmn¼ 0) then L¼ 0. This is true as a condi-
tional, but Stenger has given no reason to believe the
antecedent. Even if we associate the cosmological con-
stant with the ‘SOURCE’ side of the equations, the
antecedent nothing more than an assertion that the
vacuum (Tmn¼ 0) doesn’t gravitate.
Even if Stenger’s argument were successful, it still
wouldn’t solve the problem. The cosmological constant
problem is actually a misnomer. This section has
discussed the ‘bare’ cosmological constant. It comes
purely from general relativity, and is not associated with
any particular form of energy. The 120 orders-of-
magnitude problem refers to vacuum energy associated
with the matter fields of the universe. These are
contributions to Tmn. The source of the confusion is the
fact that vacuum energy has the same dynamical effect as
the cosmological constant, so that observations measure
an ‘effective’ cosmological constant: Leff¼Lbareþ
Lvacuum. The cosmological constant problem is really
the vacuum energy problem. Even if Stenger could show
thatLbare¼ 0, this would do nothing to addresswhyLeff is
observed to be so much smaller than the predicted con-
tributions to Lvacuum.
Quintessence: Stenger recognises that, even if he could
explain why the cosmological constant and vacuum
energy are zero, he still needs to explain why the expan-
sion of the universe is accelerating. One could appeal to an
as-yet-unknown form of energy called quintessence,
which has an equation of state w5 p/r that causes the
expansion of the universe to accelerate21 (w,1/3).
Stenger concludes that:
ya cosmological constant is not needed for early
universe inflation nor for the current cosmic accelera-
tion. Note this is not vacuum energy, which is assumed
to be identically zero, so we have no cosmological
constant problem and no need for fine-tuning.
In reply, it is logically possible that the cause of the
universe’s acceleration is not vacuum energy but some
other form of energy. However, to borrow the memorable
phrasing of Bousso (2008), if it looks, walks, swims, flies
and quacks like a duck, then the most reasonable conclu-
sion is not that it is a unicorn in a duck outfit. Whatever is
causing the accelerated expansion of the universe quacks
like vacuum energy. Quintessence is a unicorn in a duck
outfit. We are discounting a form of energy with a
plausible, independent theoretical underpinning in favour
of one that is pure speculation.
The present energy density of quintessence must
fall in the same life-permitting range that was required
of the cosmological constant. We know the possible
range of rL because we have a physical theory of
vacuum energy. What is the possible range of rQ? We
don’t know, because we have no well-tested, well-
understood theory of quintessence. This is hypothetical
physics. In the absence of a physical theory of quin-
tessence, and with the hint (as discussed above) that
gravitational physics must be involved, the natural
guess for the dark energy scale is the Planck scale.
In that case, rQ is once again 120 orders of magnitude
larger than the life-permitting scale, and we have
simply exchanged the fine-tuning of the cosmological
constant for the fine-tuning of dark energy.
Stenger’s assertion that there is no fine-tuning problem
for quintessence is false, as a number of authors have
pointed out. For example, Peacock (2007) notes that most
models of quintessence in the literature specify its prop-
erties via a potential V(f), and comments that ‘Quintes-
senceymodels do not solve the [cosmological constant]
problem: the potentials asymptote to zero, even though
there is no known symmetry that requires this’. Quintes-
sence models must be fine-tuned in exactly the same way
as the cosmological constant (see also Durrer &Maartens
2007).
Underestimating L: Stenger’s presentation of the
cosmological constant problem fails to mention some of
21
Stenger’s Equation 12.22 is incorrect, or at least misleading. By the
third Friedmann equation, _r=r ¼ 3Hð1þ wÞ, one cannot stipulate
that the density r is constant unless one sets w¼1. Equation 12.22 is
thus only valid for w¼1, in which case it reduces to Equation 12.21
and is indistinguishable from a cosmological constant. One can solve the
Friedmann equations for w 6¼1, for example, if the universe
contains only quintessence, is spatially flat and w is constant, then
a(t)¼ (t/t0)2/3(1þw), where t0 is the age of the universe.
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the reasons why this problem is so stubborn22. The first is
that we know that the electron vacuum energy does
gravitate in some situations. The vacuum polarisation
contribution to the Lamb shift is known to give a nonzero
contribution to the energy of the atom, and thus by the
equivalence principle must couple to gravity. Similar
effects are observed for nuclei. The puzzle is not just to
understand why the zero point energy does not gravitate,
but why it gravitates in some environments but not in
vacuum. Arguing that the calculation of vacuum energy is
wrong and can be ignored is naı¨ve. There are certain
contexts where we know that the calculation is correct.
Secondly, a dynamical selection mechanism for the
cosmological constant is made difficult by the fact that
only gravity can measure rL, and rL only becomes
dynamically important quite recently in the history of
the universe. Polchinski (2006) notes that many of the
mechanisms aimed at selecting a small value for rL—the
Hawking-Hartle wavefunction, the de Sitter entropy and
the Coleman-de Luccia amplitude for tunneling — can
only explain why the cosmological constant vanishes in
an empty universe.
Inflation creates another problem for would-be cos-
mological constant problem solvers. If the universe
underwent a period of inflation in its earliest stages, then
the laws of nature aremore than capable of producing life-
prohibiting accelerated expansion. The solution must
therefore be rather selective, allowing acceleration in
the early universe but severely limiting it later on.
Further, the inflaton field is yet another contributor to
the vacuum energy of the universe, and onewith universe-
accelerating pedigree. We can write a typical local mini-
mum of the inflaton potential as: V(f)¼ m (ff0)2þ
V0. Post inflation, our universe settles into theminimumat
f5f0, and the V0 term contributes to the effective
cosmological constant.We have seen this point previously:
the five- and six-pointed stars in Figure 4 show universes
in which the value of V0 is respectively too negative and
too positive for the post-inflationary universe to support
life. If the calculation is wrong, then inflation is not awell-
characterised theory. If the field does not cause the
expansion of the universe to accelerate, then it cannot
power inflation. There is no known symmetry that would
set V0¼ 0, because we do not know what the inflaton is.
Most proposed inflation mechanisms operate near the
Planck scale, so this defines the possible range of V0.
The 120 order-of-magnitude fine-tuning remains.
The Principle of Mediocrity: Stenger discusses the
multiverse solution to the cosmological constant problem,
which relies on the principle of mediocrity.Wewill give a
more detailed appraisal of this approach in Section 5.Here
we note what Stenger doesn’t: an appeal to the multiverse
is motivated by and dependent on the fine-tuning of
the cosmological constant. Those who defend the
multiverse solution to the cosmological constant problem
are quite clear that they do so because they have judged
other solutions to have failed. Examples abound:
 ‘There is not a single natural solution to the cosmologi-
cal constant problem. y[With the discovery that
L. 0] The cosmological constant problem became
suddenly harder, as one could no longer hope for a
deep symmetry setting it to zero.’ (Arkani-Hamed,
Dimopoulos & Kachru 2005)
 ‘Throughout the years many people yhave tried to
explain why the cosmological constant is small or zero.
The overwhelming consensus is that these attempts
have not been successful.’ (Susskind 2005, p. 357)
 ‘No concrete, viable theory predicting rL¼ 0 was
known by 1998 [when the acceleration of the universe
was discovered] and none has been found since.’
(Bousso 2008)
 ‘There is no known symmetry to explains why the
cosmological constant is either zero or of order the
observed dark energy.’ (Hall & Nomura 2008)
 ‘As of now, the only viable resolution of [the cosmo-
logical constant problem] is provided by the anthropic
approach.’ (Vilenkin 2010)
See also Peacock (2007) and Linde & Vanchurin
(2010), quoted above, and Susskind (2003).
Conclusion: There are a number of excellent reviews
of the cosmological constant in the scientific literature
(Weinberg 1989; Carroll 2001; Vilenkin 2003; Polchinski
2006, Durrer & Maartens 2007; Padmanabhan 2007;
Bousso 2008). The calculations are known to be correct
in other contexts and so are taken very seriously. Super-
symmetry won’t help. The problem cannot be defined
away. The most plausible small-vacuum-selecting
mechanisms don’t work in a universe that containsmatter.
Particle physics is blind to the absolute value of the
vacuum energy. The cosmological constant problem is
not a problem only at the Planck scale and thus quantum
gravity is unlikely to provide a solution. Quintessence and
the inflaton field are just more fields whose vacuum state
must be sternly commanded not to gravitate, or else
mutually balanced to an alarming degree.
There is, of course, a solution to the cosmological
problem. There is some reason— some physical reason—
why the large contributions to the vacuum energy of the
universe don’t make it life-prohibiting. We don’t currently
know what that reason is, but scientific papers continue to
be published that propose new solutions to the cosmologi-
cal constant problem(e.g. Shaw&Barrow2011).Thepoint
is this: however many ways there are of producing a life-
permitting universe, there are vastly many more ways of
making a life-prohibiting one.By the timewediscover how
our universe solves the cosmological constant problem, we
will have compiled a rather long list of ways to blow a
universe to smithereens, or quickly crush it into oblivion.
Amidst the possible universes, life-permitting ones are
exceedingly rare. This is fine-tuning par excellence.
22
Some of this section follows the excellent discussion by Polchinski
(2006).
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4.7 Stars
Stars have two essential roles to play in the origin and
evolution of intelligent life. They synthesise the elements
needed by life — big bang nucleosynthesis provides only
hydrogen, helium and lithium, which together can form
just two chemical compounds (H2 and LiH). By compar-
ison, Gingerich (2008) notes that the carbon and hydrogen
alone can be combined into around 2300 different
chemical compounds. Stars also provide a long-lived,
low-entropy source of energy for planetary life, as well as
the gravity that holds planets in stable orbits. The low-
entropy of the energy supplied by stars is crucial if life is to
‘evade the decay to equilibrium’ (Schr€odinger 1992).
4.7.1 Stellar Stability
Stars are defined by the forces that hold them in
balance. The crushing force of gravity is held at bay by
thermal and radiation pressure. The pressure is sourced by
thermal reactions at the centre of the star, which balance
the energy lost to radiation. Stars thus require a balance
between two very different forces — gravity and the
strong force — with the electromagnetic force (in the
form of electron scattering opacity) providing the link
between the two.
There is a window of opportunity for stars— too small
and they won’t be able to ignite and sustain nuclear fusion
at their cores, being supported against gravity by degen-
eracy rather than thermal pressure; too large and radiation
pressure will dominate over thermal pressure, allowing
unstable pulsations. Barrow & Tipler (1986, p. 332)
showed that this window is open when,
kTnuc
mec2
t 2 ) a
2mp
me
t102; ð4Þ
where the first expression uses the more exact calculation
of the right-hand-side by Adams (2008), and the second
expression uses Barrow & Tipler’s approximation for the
minimum nuclear ignition temperature Tnuc,Za2mp,
where ZE 0.025 for hydrogen burning. Outside this
range, stars are not stable: anything big enough to burn is
big enough to blow itself apart. Adams (2008) showed
there is another criterion that must be fulfilled for stars
have a stable burning configuration,
hG
mea2C
t 3:1 106; ð5Þ
where C is a composite parameter related to nuclear
reaction rates, and we have specialised equation 44 of
Adams to the casewhere stellar opacity is due to Thomson
scattering.
Adams combines these constraints in (G, a, C) param-
eter space, holding all other parameters constant, as
shown in Figure 5. Below the solid line, stable stars are
possible. The dashed (dotted) line shows the correspond-
ing constraint for universes in which C is increased
(decreased) by a factor of 100. Adams remarks that
‘within the parameter space shown, which spans 10 orders
of magnitude in both a and G, about one-fourth of the
space supports the existence of stars’.
Stenger (FOFT 243) cites Adams’ result, but crucially
omits the modifier shown. Adams makes no attempt to
justify the limits of parameter space as he has shown
them. Further, there is no justification of the use of
logarithmic axes, which significantly affects the estimate
of the probability23. The figure of ‘one-fourth’ is almost
meaningless — given any life-permitting region, one can
make it equal one-fourth of parameter space by chopping
and changing said space. This is a perfect example of the
cheap-binoculars fallacy. If one allowsG to increase until
gravity is as strong as the strong force (aGE asE 1), and
uses linear rather than logarithmic axes, the stable-
star-permitting region occupies , 1038 of parameter
space. Even with logarithmic axes, fine-tuning cannot
be avoided—zero is a possible value ofG, and thus is part
of parameter space. However, such a universe is not life-
permitting, and so there is a minimum life-permitting
value of G. A logarithmic axis, by placing G¼ 0 at
negative infinity, puts an infinitely large region of param-
eter space outside of the life-permitting region. Stable
stars would then require infinite fine-tuning. Note further
that the fact that our universe (the triangle in Figure 5)
isn’t particularly close to the life-permitting boundary is
irrelevant to fine-tuning as we have defined it. We
conclude that the existence of stable stars is indeed a
fine-tuned property of our universe.
4.7.2 The Hoyle Resonance
One of the most famous examples of fine-tuning is the
Hoyle resonance in carbon. Hoyle reasoned that if such a
resonance level did not exist at just the right place, then
stars would be unable to produce the carbon required
by life24.
Is the Hoyle resonance (called the 0þ level) fine-
tuned? Stenger quotes the work of Livio et al. (1989),
who considered the effect on the carbon and oxygen
production of stars when the 0þ level is shifted. They
found one could increase the energy of the level by 60 keV
without effecting the level of carbon production. Is this a
large change or a small one? Livio et al. (1989) ask just
this question, noting the following. The permitted shift
represents a 0.7% change in the energy of the level itself.
23
More precisely, to use the area element in Figure 5 as the probability
measure, one is assuming a probability distribution that is linear in
log10G and log10 a. There is, of course, no problem in using logarithmic
axes to illustrate the life-permitting region.
24
Hoyle’s prediction is not an ‘anthropic prediction’. As Smolin (2007)
explains, the prediction can be formulated as follows: a.) Carbon is
necessary for life. b.) There are substantial amounts of carbon in our
universe. c.) If stars are to produce substantial amounts of carbon, then
there must be a specific resonance level in carbon. d.) Thus, the specific
resonance level in carbon exists. The conclusion does not depend in any
way on the first, ‘anthropic’ premise. The argument would work just as
well if the element in question were the inert gas neon, for which the first
premise is (probably) false.
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It is 3% of the energy difference between the 0þ level and
the next level up in the carbon nucleus (3). It is 16% of
the difference between the energy of the 0þ state and the
energy of three alpha particles, which come together to
form carbon.
Stenger argues that this final estimate is the most
appropriate one, quoting from Weinberg (2007):
‘We know that even-even nuclei have states that are
well described as composites of a particles. One such
state is the ground state of Be8, which is unstable
against fission into two a particles.The same a–a
potential that produces that sort of unstable state in
Be8 could naturally be expected to produce an unstable
state in C12 that is essentially a composite of three a
particles, and that therefore appears as a low-energy
resonance in a-Be8 reactions. So the existence of this
state does not seem to me to provide any evidence of
fine tuning.’
As Cohen (2008) notes, the 0þ state is known as a
breathing mode; all nuclei have such a state.
However, we are not quite done with assessing this
fine-tuning case. The existence of the 0þ level is not
enough. It must have the right energy, and so we need to
ask how the properties of the resonance level, and thus
stellar nucleosynthesis, change as we alter the fundamen-
tal constants. Oberhummer, Csoto & Schlattl (2000a)25
have performed such calculations, combining the predic-
tions of a microscopic 12-body, three-alpha cluster model
of 12C (as alluded to by Weinberg) with a stellar nucleo-
synthesis code. They conclude that:
Even with a change of 0.4% in the strength of
[nucleon-nucleon] force, carbon-based life appears to
be impossible, since all the stars then would produce
either almost solely carbon or oxygen, but could not
produce both elements.
Schlattl et al. (2004), by the same group, noted an
important caveat on their previous result. Modelling the
later, post-hydrogen-burning stages of stellar evolution is
difficult even for modern codes, and the inclusion of
He-shell flashes seems to lessen the degree of fine-tuning
of the Hoyle resonance.
Ekstr€om et al. (2010) considered changes to the Hoyle
resonance in the context of Population III stars. These
first-generation stars play an important role in the pro-
duction of the elements needed by life. Ekstr€om et al.
(2010) place similar limits to Oberhummer et al. (2000a)
on the nucleon-nucleon force, and go further by translat-
ing these limits into limits on the fine-structure
constant, a. A fractional change in a of one part in 105
would change the energy of the Hoyle resonance enough
that stars would contain carbon or oxygen at the end of
helium burning but not both.
There is again reason to be cautious, as stellar evolu-
tion has not been followed to the very end of the life
of the star. Nevertheless, these calculations are highly
suggestive — the main process by which carbon and
oxygen are synthesised in our universe is drastically
curtailed by a tiny change in the fundamental constants.
Life would need to hope that sufficient carbon and oxygen
are synthesized in other ways, such as supernovae.
We conclude that Stenger has failed to turn back the force
of this fine-tuning case. The ability of stars in our uni-
verse to produce both carbon and oxygen seems to be a
rare talent.
4.8 Forces and Masses
In Chapters 7–10, Stenger turns his attention to the
strength of the fundamental forces and the masses of the
elementary particles. These quantities are among themost
discussed in the fine-tuning literature, beginning with
Carter (1974), Carr & Rees (1979) and Barrow & Tipler
(1986). Figure 6 shows in white the life-permitting region
of (a, b) (left) and (a, as) (right) parameter space
26. The
axes are scaled like arctan (log10[x]), so that the interval
[0,N] maps onto a finite range. The blue cross shows our
universe. This figure is similar to those of Tegmark
(1998). The various regions illustrated are as follows:
1. For hydrogen to exist — to power stars and form
water and organic compounds — we must have
25
See alsoOberhummer, Pichler&Csoto (1998); Oberhummer, Csoto&
Schlattl (2000b); Csoto, Oberhummer & Schlattl (2001); Oberhummer
(2001).
26
In the left plot, we holdmp constant, so we vary b¼me/mp by varying
the electron mass.



Figure 5 The parameter space (G, a), shown relative to their
values in our universe (G0, a0). The triangle shows our universe.
Below the solid line, stable stars are possible. The dashed (dotted)
line shows the corresponding constraint for universes in which C is
increased (decreased) by a factor of 100. Note that the axes are
logarithmic and span 10 orders of magnitude. Figure from Adams
(2008), reproduced with permission of IOP Publishing Ltd.
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me,mnmp. Otherwise, the electron will be cap-
tured by the proton to form a neutron (Hogan 2006;
Damour & Donoghue 2008).
2. For stable atoms, we need the radius of the electron
orbit to be significantly larger than the nuclear radius,
which requires ab/as{ 1 (Barrow & Tipler 1986,
p. 320). The region shown is ab/as, 1/1000, which
Stenger adopts (FOFT 244).
3. We require that the typical energy of chemical reac-
tions is much smaller than the typical energy of
nuclear reactions. This ensures that the atomic con-
stituents of chemical species maintain their identity
in chemical reactions. This requires a2b/as
2{ 1
(Barrow & Tipler 1986, p. 320). The region shown
is a2b/as
2, 1/1000.
4. Unless b1/4{ 1, stable ordered molecular structures
(like chromosomes) are not stable. The atomswill too
easily stray from their place in the lattice and the
substance will spontaneously melt (Barrow & Tipler
1986, p. 305). The region shown is b1/4, 1/3.
5. The stability of the proton requires at (mdmu)/
141MeV, so that the extra electromagnetic mass-
energy of a proton relative to a neutron is more than
counter-balanced by the bare quark masses (Hogan
2000; Hall & Nomura 2008).
6. Unless a{ 1, the electrons in atoms and molecules
are unstable to pair creation (Barrow & Tipler 1986,
p. 297). The limit shown is a, 0.2. A similar con-
straint is calculated by Lieb & Yau (1988).
7. As in Equation 4, stars will not be stable unless
b\ a2/100.
8. Unless as/as,0t 1.003þ 0.031a/a0 (Davies 1972),
the diproton has a bound state, which affects stellar
burning and big bang nucleosynthesis. (Note, how-
ever, the caveats mentioned in Footnote 9.)
9. Unless ast 0.3a1/2, carbon and all larger elements
are unstable (Barrow & Tipler 1986, p. 326).
10. Unless as/as,0\ 0.91 (Davies 1972), the deuteron is
unstable and the main nuclear reaction in stars (pp)
does not proceed. A similar effect would be
achieved27 unless mdmuþme, 3.4MeV which
makes the pp reaction energetically unfavourable
(Hogan 2000). This region is numerically very
similar to Region 1 in the left plot; the different
scaling with the quark masses is illustrated in
Figure 7.
 The grey stripe on the left of each plot shows where
a, aG, rendering electric forces weaker than gravita-
tional ones.
 To the left of our universe (the blue cross) is shown the
limit of Adams (2008) on stellar stability, Equation 5.
The limit shown is a. 7.3 105, as read off figure 5
of Adams (2008). The dependence on b and as has not
been calculated, and so only the limit for the case when
these parameters take the value they have in our
universe is shown28.
 The upper limit shown in the right plot of Figure 6 is the
result of MacDonald & Mullan (2009) that the amount
of hydrogen left over from big bang nucleosynthesis is
significantly diminished when as. 0.27. Note that this
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Figure 6 The life-permitting region (shown in white) in the (a, b) (left) and (a, as) (right) parameter space, with other constants held at their
values in our universe. Our universe is shown as a blue cross. These figures are similar to those of Tegmark (1998). The numbered regions and
solid lines are explained in Section 4.8. The blue dot-dashed line is discussed in Section 4.8.2.
27
Aswith the stability of the diproton, there is a caveat.Weinberg (2007)
notes that if the pp reaction pþþ pþ- 2Hþ eþne is rendered energeti-
cally unfavourable by changing the fundamental masses, then the
reaction pþþ eþ pþ- 2Hþ ne will still be favourable so long as
mdmume, 3.4MeV. This is a weaker condition. Note, however,
that the pep reaction is 400 times less likely to occur in our universe than
pp, meaning that pep stars must burn hotter. Such stars have not been
simulated in the literature. Note also that the full effect of an unstable
deuteron on stars and their formation has not been calculated. Primordial
helium burningmay create enough carbon, nitrogen and oxygen to allow
the CNO cycle to burn hydrogen in later generation stars.
28
Even this limit should be noted with caution, as it holds for constantC.
As C appears to depend on a, the corresponding limit on a may be a
different plane to the one shown in Figure 6.
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is weaker than the condition that the diproton be bound.
The dependence on a has not been calculated, so only a
1D limit is shown.
 The dashed line in the left plot shows a striking
coincidence discussed by Carter (1974), namely
a12b4, aG. Near this line, the universe will contain
both radiative and convective stars. Carter conjec-
tured that life may require both types for reasons
pertaining to planet formation and supernovae. This
reason is somewhat dubious, but a better case can be
made. The same coincidence can be shown to ensure
that the surface temperature of stars is close to
‘biological temperature’ (Barrow & Tipler 1986,
p. 338). In other words, it ensures that the photons
emitted by stars have the right energy to break
chemical bonds. This permits photosynthesis, allow-
ing electromagnetic energy to be converted into and
stored as chemical energy in plants. However, it is not
clear how close to the line a universe must be to be
life-permitting, and the calculation considers only
radiation dominated stars.
 The left solid line shows the lower limit a. 1/180 for a
grand-unified theory to unify no higher than the Planck
scale. The right solid line shows the boundary of the
condition that protons be stable on stellar timescales
(b2. a (aG exp a
1)1, Barrow&Tipler 1986, p. 358).
These limits are based on Grand Unified Theories
(GUT) and thus somewhat more speculative. We will
say more about GUTs below.
 The triple-alpha constraint is not shown. The
constraint on carbon production from Ekstr€om et al.
(2010) is 3.5 105tDa/atþ1.8 105, as dis-
cussed in Section 4.7.2. Note also the caveats discussed
there. This only considers the change in a i.e. horizon-
tally, and the life-permitting region is likely to be a
2D strip in both the (a, b) and (a, as) plane. As this strip
passes our universe, its width in the x-direction is
one-thousandth of the width of one of the vertical
black lines.
 The limits placed on a andb from chemistry are weaker
than the constraints listed above. If we consider the
nucleus as fixed in space, then the time-independent,
non-relativistic Schr€odinger equation scales with a2me
i.e. the relative energy and properties of the energy
levels of electrons (which determine chemical bond-
ing) are unchanged (Barrow & Tipler 1986, p. 533).
The change in chemistry with fundamental parameters
depends on the accuracy of the approximations of an
infinite mass nucleus and non-relativistic electrons.
This has been investigated by King et al. (2010) who
considered the bond angle and length in water, and the
reaction energy of a number of organic reactions.
While ‘drastic changes in the properties of water’ occur
for a\ 0.08 and b\ 0.054, it is difficult to predict
what impact these changes would have on the origin
and evolution of life.
Note that there are four more constraints on a, me and mp
from the cosmological considerations of Tegmark et al.
(2006), as discussed in Section 4.2. There are more cases
of fine-tuning to be considered when we expand our view
to consider all the parameters of the standard model of
particle physics.
Agrawal et al. (1998a, b) considered the life-
permitting range of the Higgs mass parameter m2, and
the corresponding limits on the vacuum expectation
value, v¼ (m2/l)1/2, which takes the value 246GeV¼
2 1017mPl in our universe. After exploring the range
[mPl, mPl], they find that ‘only for values in a narrow
window is life likely to be possible’. In Planck units,
the relevant limits are: for v. 4 1017, the deuteron
is strongly unstable (see point 10 above); for v. 1016,
the neutron is heavier than the proton by more than the
nucleon’s binding energy, so that even bound neutrons
decay into protons and no nuclei larger than hydrogen
are stable; for v. 2 1014, only the Dþþ particle is
stable and the only stable nucleus has the chemistry of
helium; for vt 2 1019, stars will form very slowly
(,1017 yr) and burn out very quickly (,1 yr), and
the large number of stable nucleon species may
make nuclear reactions so easy that the universe con-
tains no light nuclei. Damour & Donoghue (2008)
refined the limits of Agrawal et al. by considering
nuclear binding, concluding that unless 0.78 1017,
v, 3.3 1017 hydrogen is unstable to the reaction
Figure 7 Constraints from the stability of hydrogen and deuteri-
um, in terms of the electron mass (me) and the down-up quark mass
difference (mdmu). The condition labelled no nuclei was dis-
cussed in Section 4.8, point 10. The line labelled noatoms is the same
condition as point 1, expressed in terms of the quark masses. The
thin solid vertical line shows ‘a constraint from a particular SO(10)
grand unified scenario’. Figure fromHogan (2007), reproducedwith
permission of Cambridge University Press.
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pþ e- nþ n (if v is too small) or else there is no
nuclear binding at all (if v is too large).
Jeltema & Sher (1999) combined the conclusions of
Agrawal et al. and Oberhummer et al. (2000a) to place a
constraint on the Higgs vev from the fine-tuning of the
Hoyle resonance (Section 4.7.2). They conclude that a 1%
change in v from its value in our universe would signifi-
cantly affect the ability of stars to synthesise both oxygen
and carbon. Hogan (2006) reached a similar conclusion:
‘In the absence of an identified compensating factor,
increases in [v/LQCD] of more than a few percent lead to
major changes in the overall cosmic carbon creation and
distribution’. Remember, however, the caveats of Section
4.7.2: it is difficult to predict exactly when amajor change
becomes a life-prohibiting change.
There has been considerable attention given to the
fine-tuning of the masses of fundamental particles, in
particular mu, md and me. We have already seen the
calculation of Barr & Khan (2007) in Figure 2, which
shows the life-permitting region of the mu–md plane.
Hogan (2000) was one of the first to consider the fine-
tuning of the quark masses (see also Hogan 2006). Such
results have been confirmed and extended by Damour &
Donoghue (2008), Hall & Nomura (2008) and Bousso
et al. (2009).
Jaffe et al. (2009) examined a different slice through
parameter space, varying the masses of the quarks while
‘holding as much as possible of the rest of the Standard
Model phenomenology constant’ [emphasis original]. In
particular, they fix the electronmass, and varyLQCD so that
the average mass of the lightest baryon(s) is 940MeV, as
in our universe. These restrictions are chosen to make the
characterisation of these other universes more certain.
Only nuclear stability is considered, so that a universe is
deemed congenial if both carbon and hydrogen are stable.
The resulting congenial range is shown in Figure 8. The
height of each triangle is proportional to the total mass of
the three lightest quarks: mT¼muþmdþms; the centre
triangle has mT as in our universe. The perpendicular
distance from each side represents the mass of the u, d and
s quarks. The lower green region shows universes like
ours with two light quarks (mu,md{ms), and is bounded
above by the stability of some isotope of hydrogen (in this
case, tritium) and below by the corresponding limit for
carbon 10C, (21.80MeV,mpmn, 7.97MeV). The
smaller green strip shows a novel congenial region, where
there is one light quark (md{msEmu). This congenial-
ity band has half the width of the band in which our
universe is located. The red regions are uncongenial,
while white regions show where it is uncertain where
the red-green boundary should lie. Note two things about
the larger triangle on the right. Firstly, the smaller
congenial band detaches from the edge of the triangle
for mT\ 1.22mT,0 as the lightest baryon is the D
þþ,
which would be incapable of forming nuclei. Secondly,
and most importantly for our purposes, the absolute width
of the green regions remains the same, and thus the
congenial fraction of the space decreases approximately
as 1/mT. Moving from the centre (mT¼mT,0) to the right
(mT¼ 2mT,0) triangle of Figure 8, the congenial fraction
drops from 14% to 7%. Finally, ‘congenial’ is almost
certainly a weaker constraint than ‘life-permitting’, since
only nuclear stability is investigated. For example,
a universe with only tritium will have an element which
is chemically very similar to hydrogen, but stars will not
have 1H as fuel and will therefore burn out significantly
faster.
Tegmark, Vilenkin & Pogosian (2005) studied
anthropic constraints on the total mass of the three
neutrino species. If
P
mn\ 1 eV then galaxy formation
is significantly suppressed by free streaming. If
P
mn is
large enough that neutrinos are effectively another type of
cold dark matter, then the baryon fraction in haloes would
be very low, affecting baryonic disk and star formation. If
Figure 8 The results of Jaffe et al. (2009), showing in green the region of (mu,md,ms) parameter space that is ‘congenial’, meaning that at least
one isotope of hydrogen and carbon is stable. The height of each triangle is proportional to mT¼muþmdþms, with the centre triangle having
mT as in our universe. The perpendicular distance from each side represents the mass of the u, d and s quarks. See the text for details of the
instabilities in the red ‘uncongenial’ regions. Reprinted figure with permission from Jaffe et al. (2009). Copyright (2009) by the American
Physical Society.
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all neutrinos are heavy, then neutrons would be stable and
big bang nucleosynthesis would leave no hydrogen for
stars and organic compounds. This study only varies one
parameter, but its conclusions are found to be ‘rather
robust’ when rL is also allowed to vary (Pogosian &
Vilenkin 2007).
There are a number of tentative anthropic limits relat-
ing to baryogenesis. Baryogenesis is clearly crucial to
life — a universe which contained equal numbers of
protons and antiprotons at annihilation would only con-
tain radiation, which cannot form complex structures.
However, we do not currently have a well-understood
and well-tested theory of baryogenesis, so caution is
advised. Gould (2010) has argued that three or more
generations of quarks and leptons are required for CP
violation, which is one of the necessary conditions for
baryogenesis (Sakharov 1967; Cahn 1996; Schellekens
2008). Hall & Nomura (2008) state that v/LQCD, 1 is
required ‘so that the baryon asymmetry of the early
universe is not washed out by sphaleron effects’ (see also
Arkani-Hamed et al. 2005).
Harnik, Kribs & Perez (2006) attempted to find a
region of parameter space which is life-permitting in the
absence of the weak force. With some ingenuity, they
plausibly discovered one, subject to the following con-
ditions. To prevent big bang nucleosynthesis burning all
hydrogen to helium in the early universe, they must use a
‘judicious parameter adjustment’ and set the baryon to
photon radio Zb¼ 4 1012. The result is a substantially
increased abundance of deuterium,,10% bymass.LQCD
and the masses of the light quarks and leptons are held
constant, which means that the nucleon masses and thus
nuclear physics is relatively unaffected (except, of course,
for beta decay) so long as we ‘insist that the weakless
universe is devoid of heavy quarks’ to avoid problems
relating to the existence of stable baryons29 Lc
þ, Lb
0 and
Lt
þ. Since v,mPl in the weakless universe, holding the
light fermion masses constant requires the Yukawa para-
meters (Ge, Gu, Gd, Gs) must all be set by hand to be less
than 1020 (Feldstein et al. 2006). The weakless uni-
verse requires Obaryon/Odark matter, 103, 100 times less
than in our universe. This is very close to the limit of
Tegmark et al. (2006), who calculated that unlessObaryon/
Odark matter\ 5 103, gas will not cool into galaxies to
form stars. Galaxy formation in theweakless universewill
thus be considerably less efficient, relying on rare statis-
tical fluctuations and cooling viamolecular viscosity. The
proton-proton reaction which powers stars in our universe
relies on the weak interaction, so stars in the weakless
universe burn via proton-deuterium reactions, using deu-
terium left over from the big bang. Stars will burn at a
lower temperature, and probably with shorter lifetimes.
Stars will still be able to undergo accretion supernovae
(Type 1a), but the absence of core-collapse supernovae
will seriously affect the oxygen available for planet
formation and life (Clavelli & White 2006). Only ,1%
of the oxygen in our universe comes from accretion
supernovae. It is then somewhat optimistic to claim that
(Gedalia, Jenkins & Perez 2011),
pðobserverjfausgÞ  pðobserverjfaweaklessgÞ; ð6Þ
where {aus} ({aweakless}) represents the set of parameters of
our (the weakless) universe. Note that, even if Equation 6
holds, the weakless universe at best opens up a life-
permitting region of parameter space of similar size to the
region in which our universe resides. The need for a life-
permitting universe to be fine-tuned is not significantly
affected.
4.8.1 The Origin of Mass
Let’s consider Stenger’s responses to these cases of
fine-tuning.
Higgs and Hierarchy:
‘Electrons, muons, and tauons all pick up mass by the
Higgs mechanism. Quarks must pick up some of their
masses this way, but they obtain most of their masses
byway of the strong interactionyAll thesemasses are
orders of magnitude less than the Planck mass, and no
fine-tuning was necessary to make gravity much
weaker than electromagnetism. This happened natu-
rally andwould have occurred for a wide range ofmass
values, which, after all, are just small corrections to
their intrinsically zero masses. yIn any case, these
small mass corrections do not call for any fine-tuning
or indicate that our universe is in any way special.y
[mpme/m
2
Pl] is so small because the masses of the
electron and the protons are so small compared to the
Planck mass, which is the only ‘natural’ mass you can
form from the simplest combination of fundamental
constants.’ (FOFT 154,156,175)
Stenger takes no cognizance of the hierarchy and flavour
problems, widely believed to be amongst the most impor-
tant problems of particle physics:
Lisa Randal: ‘The universe seems to have two entirely
different mass scales, and we don’t understand why
they are so different. There’s what’s called the Planck
scale, which is associated with gravitational interac-
tions. It’s a huge mass scaley1019GeV. Then there’s
the electroweak scale, which sets the masses for the W
and Z bosons. [,100GeV]ySo the hierarchy prob-
lem, in its simplest manifestation, is how can you have
these particles be so light when the other scale is so
big.’ (Taubes 2002)
FrankWilzcek: ‘We have noycompelling idea about
the origin of the enormous number [mPl/me]¼ 2.4
1022. If you would like to humble someone who talks
glibly about the Theory of Everything, just ask about it,
and watch ‘em squirm.’ (Wilczek 2005)
29
In the absence of weak decay, the weakless universe will conserve
each individual quark number.
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Leonard Susskind: ‘The up- and down-quarks are
absurdly light. The fact that they are roughly twenty
thousand times lighter than particles like the Z-boson
yneeds an explanation. The Standard Model has not
provided one. Thus, we can ask what the world would
be like is the up- and down-quarks were much heavier
than they are. Once again — disaster!’ (Susskind
2005, p. 176)
The problem is as follows. The mass of a fundamental
particle in the standard model is set by two factors:
mi ¼ Giv=
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
, where i labels the particle species, Gi is
called the Yukawa parameter (e.g. electron: GeE 2.9
106, up quark: GuE 1.4 105, down quark: GdE
2.8 105), and v is the Higgs vacuum expectation value,
which is the same for all particles (see Burgess & Moore
2006, for an introduction). Note that, contra Stenger, the
bare masses of the quarks are not related to the strong
force30.
There are, then, two independent ways in which the
masses of the basic constituents of matter are surprisingly
small: v¼ 2 1017mPl, which ‘is so notorious that it’s
acquired a special name— the Hierarchy Problem— and
spawned a vast, inconclusive literature’ (Wilczek 2006a),
and Gi, 106, which implies that, for example, the
electron mass is unnaturally smaller than its (unnaturally
small) natural scale set by the Higgs condensate (Wilczek
2007, p. 53) . This is known as the flavour problem.
Let’s take a closer look at the hierarchy problem. The
problem (as ably explained by Martin 1998) is that the
Higgs mass (squared) mH
2 receives quantum corrections
from the virtual effects of every particle that couples,
directly or indirectly, to the Higgs field. These corrections
are enormous — their natural scale is the Planck scale, so
that these contributions must be fine-tuned to mutually
cancel to one part in mPl
2 /mH
2 E 1032. Stenger’s reply is to
say that:
‘ythe masses of elementary particles are small com-
pared to the Planck mass. No fine-tuning is required.
Small masses are a natural consequence of the origin of
mass. The masses of elementary particles are essen-
tially small corrections to their intrinsically zero
masses.’ (FOFT 187)
Here we see the problem itself presented as its solution. It
is precisely the smallness of the quantum corrections
wherein the fine-tuning lies. If the Planck mass is the
‘natural’ (FOFT 175) mass scale in physics, then it sets
the scale for all mass terms, corrections or otherwise. Just
calling them ‘small’ doesn’t explain anything.
Attempts to solve the hierarchy problem have driven
the search for theories beyond the standard model:
technicolor, the supersymmetric standard model, large
extra dimensions, warped compactifications, little
Higgs theories and more — even anthropic solutions
(Arkani-Hamed & Dimopoulos 2005; Arkani-Hamed
et al. 2005; Feldstein et al. 2006; Hall & Nomura
2008, 2010; Donoghue et al. 2010). Perhaps the most
popular option is supersymmetry, whereby the Higgs
mass scale doesn’t receive corrections from mass scales
above the supersymmetry-breaking scale LSM due to
equal and opposite contributions from supersymmetric
partners. This ties v to LSM. The question now is: why is
LSM{mPl? This is known in the literature as ‘the
m-problem’, in reference to the parameter in the super-
symmetric potential that sets the relevant mass scale. The
value of m in our universe is probably,102–103GeV. The
natural scale for m is mPl, and thus we still do not have an
explanation for why the quark and lepton masses are so
small. Low-energy supersymmetry does not by itself
explain themagnitude of theweak scale, though it protects
it from radiative correction (Barr&Khan 2007). Solutions
to the m-problem can be found in the literature (seeMartin
1998, for a discussion and references).
We can draw some conclusions. First, Stenger’s dis-
cussion of the surprising lightness of fundamental masses
iswoefully inadequate. Topresent it as a solvedproblemof
particle physics is a gross misrepresentation of the litera-
ture. Secondly, smallness is not sufficient for life. Recall
that Damour & Donoghue (2008) showed that unless
0.78 1017, v/mPl, 3.3 1017, the elements are
unstable. The masses must be sufficiently small but not
too small. Finally, suppose that the LHC discovers that
supersymmetry is a (broken) symmetry of our universe.
This would not be the discovery that the universe could not
have been different. It would not be the discovery that the
masses of the fundamental particlesmustbe small. Itwould
at most show that our universe has chosen a particularly
elegant and beautiful way to be life-permitting.
QCD andMass-Without-Mass: The bare quark masses,
discussed above, only account for a small fraction of the
mass of the proton and neutron. The majority of the other
95% comes from the strong force binding energy of the
valence quarks. This contribution can be written as
aLQCD, where aE 4 is a dimensionless constant deter-
mined by quantum chromodynamics (QCD). In Planck
units, LQCDE 10
20mPl. The question ‘why is gravity so
feeble?’ (i.e. aG{ 1) is at least partly answered if we can
explain why LQCD{mPl. Unlike the bare masses of the
quarks and leptons, we can answer this question from
within the standard model.
The strength of the strong force as is a function of the
energy of the interaction. LQCD is the mass-energy scale
30
Themost charitable reading of Stenger’s claim is that he is referring to
the constituent quark model, wherein the mass-energy of the cloud of
virtual quarks and gluons that surround a valence quark in a composite
particle is assigned to the quark itself. In this model, the quarks have
masses of,300MeV. The constituent quark model is a non-relativistic
phenomenological model which provides a simple approximation to the
more fundamental but more difficult theory (QCD) that is useful at low-
energies. It is completely irrelevant to the cases of fine-tuning in the
literature concerning quark masses (e.g. Agarwal et al. 1998a; Hogan
2000; Barr&Khan 2007), all ofwhich discuss the bare (or current) quark
masses. In fact, even a charge of irrelevance is too charitable — Stenger
later quotes the quark masses as ,5MeV, which is the current quark
mass.
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at which as diverges. Given that the strength of the strong
force runs very slowly (logarithmically) with energy,
there is a exponential relationship between LQCD and
the scale of grand unification mU:
LQCD
mU
 exp  b
asðmUÞ
 
; ð7Þ
where b is a constant of order unity. Thus, if the QCD
coupling is evenmoderately small at the unification scale,
the QCD scale will be a long way away. To make this
work in our universe, we need as(mU)E 1/25, and
mUE 10
16GeV (De Boer & Sander 2004). The calcula-
tion also depends on the spectrum of quark flavours; see
Hogan (2000), Wilczek (2002) and Schellekens (2008,
Appendix C).
As an explanation for the value of the proton and
neutron mass in our universe, we aren’t done yet. We
don’t know how to calculate the as(mU), and there is still
the puzzle of why the unification scale is three orders of
magnitude below the Planck scale. From a fine-tuning
perspective, however, this seems to be good progress,
replacing the major miracle LQCD/mPl, 1020 with a
more minor one, as(mU), 101. Such explanations have
been discussed in the fine-tuning literature for many years
(Carr & Rees 1979; Hogan 2000).
Note that this does not completely explain the small-
ness of the protonmass, sincemp is the sum of a number of
contributions: QCD (LQCD), electromagnetism, the
masses of the valence quarks (mu and md), and the mass
of the virtual quarks, including the strange quark, which
makes a surprisingly large contribution to the mass of
ordinary matter. We need all of the contributions to be
small in order for mp to be small.
Potential problems arisewhenwe need the protonmass
to fall within a specific range, rather than just be small,
since the proton mass depends very sensitively (exponen-
tially) on aU. For example, consider Region 4 in Figure 6,
b1/4{ 1. The constraint shown, b1/4, 1/3 would require
a 20-fold decrease in the protonmass to be violated, which
(using Equation 7) translates to decreasing aU by,0.003.
Similarly, Region 7 will be entered if aU is increased
31 by
,0.008.Wewill havemore to say about grand unification
and fine-tuning below. For the moment, we note that the
fine-tuning of themass of the proton can be translated into
anthropic limits on GUT parameters.
Protons, Neutrons, Electrons: We turn now to the
relative masses of the three most important particles in
our universe: the proton, neutron and electron, from
which atoms are made. Consider first the ratio of the
electron to the proton mass, b, of which Stenger says:
‘ywe can argue that the electron mass is going to be
much smaller than the proton mass in any universe
even remotely like ours.yThe electron gets its mass
by interacting electroweakly with the Higgs boson.
The proton, a composite particle, gets most of its mass
from the kinetic energies of gluons swirling around
inside. They interact with one another by way of the
strong interaction, leading to relatively high kinetic
energies. Unsurprisingly, the proton’s mass is much
higher than the electron’s and is likely to be so over a
large region of parameter space.yThe electron mass
is much smaller than the protonmass because it gets its
mass solely from the electroweak Higgs mechanism,
so being less than 1.29MeV is not surprising and also
shows no sign of fine-tuning.’ (FOFT 164,178)
Remember that fine-tuning compares the life-permitting
range of a parameter with the possible range. FOFT has
compared the electron mass in our universe with the
electron mass in universes ‘like ours’, thus missing the
point entirely.
In terms of the parameters of the standard model,
bme/mpEGev/aLQCD. The smallness of b is thus quite
surprising, since the ratio of the natural mass scale of the
electron and the proton is v/LQCDE 10
3. The smallness of
b stems from the fact that the dimensionless constant for
the proton is of order unity (aE 4), while the Yukawa
constant for the electron is unnaturally small GeE 10
6.
Stenger’s assertion that the Higgs mechanism (with mass
scale 246GeV) accounts for the smallness of the electron
mass (0.000511GeV) is false.
The other surprising aspect of the smallness of b is the
remarkable proximity of the QCD and electroweak scales
(Arkani-Hamed & Dimopoulos 2005); in Planck units,
vE 2 1017mPl and LQCDE 2 1020mPl. Given that
b is constrained from both above and below anthropically
(Figure 6), this coincidence is required for life.
Let’s look at the proton-neutron mass difference.
‘ythis apparently fortuitous arrangement of masses
has a plausible explanation within the framework of
the standard model.ythe proton and neutron get most
of their masses from the strong interaction, which
makes no distinction between protons and neutrons.
If that were all there was to it, their masses would be
equal. However, the masses and charges of the two are
not equal, which implies that the mass difference is
electroweak in origin.yAgain, if quark masses were
solely a consequence of the strong interaction, these
would be equal. Indeed, the lattice QCD calculations
discussed in chapter 7 give the u and d quarks masses
of 3.3	 0.4MeV. On the other hand, the masses of the
two quarks are estimated to be in the range 1.5 to
3MeV for the u quark and 2.5 to 5.5MeV for the d
quark. This gives a mass difference range mdmu
from 1 to 4Mev. The neutron-proton mass difference
is 1.29MeV, well within that range. We conclude that
31
A few caveats. This estimate assumes that this small change in aU will
not significantly change a. The dependence seems to be flatter than
linear, so this assumption appears to hold. Also, be careful in applying
the limits on b in Figure 6 to the proton mass, as where appropriate only
the electron mass was varied. For example, Region 1 depends on the
proton-neutron mass difference, which doesn’t change with LQCD and
thus does not place a constraint on aU.
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the mass difference between the neutron and proton
results from the mass difference between the d and u
quarks, which, in turn, must result from their electro-
weak interactionwith theHiggs field. No fine-tuning is
once again evident.’ (FOFT 178)
Let’s first deal with the Lattice QCD (LQCD) calcula-
tions. LQCD is amethod of reformulating the equations of
QCD in a way that allows them to be solved on a
supercomputer. LQCD does not calculate the quark
masses from the fundamental parameters of the standard
model— they are fundamental parameters of the standard
model. Rather, ‘[t]he experimental values of the p, r and
K or f masses are employed to fix the physical scale and
the light quark masses’ (Iwasaki 2000). Every LQCD
calculation takes great care to explain that they are
inferring the quark masses from the masses of observed
hadrons (see, for example, Davies et al. 2004; Du¨rr et al.
2008; Laiho 2011).
This is important because fine-tuning involves a com-
parison between the life-permitting range of the funda-
mental parameters with their possible range. LQCD
doesn’t address either. It demonstrates that (with no small
amount of cleverness) one can measure the quark masses
in our universe. It does not show that the quark masses
could not have been otherwise. When Stenger compares
two different values for the quark masses (3.3MeV and
1.5–3MeV), he is not comparing a theoretical calculation
with an experimental measurement. He is comparing two
measurements. Stenger has demonstrated that the u and d
quark masses in our universe are equal (within experi-
mental error) to the u and d quark masses in our universe.
Stenger states that mnmp results from mdmu. This
is false, as there is also a contribution from the electro-
magnetic force (Gasser & Leutwyler 1982; Hall &
Nomura 2008). This would tend to make the (charged)
proton heavier than the (neutral) neutron, and hence we
need the mass difference of the light quarks to be large
enough to overcome this contribution. As discussed in
Section 4.8 (item 5), this requires at (mdmu)/
141MeV. The lightness of the up-quark is especially
surprising, since the up-quark’s older brothers (charm
and top) are significantly heavier than their partners
(strange and bottom).
Finally, andmost importantly, note carefully Stenger’s
conclusion. He states that no fine-tuning is needed for the
neutron-proton mass difference in our universe to be
approximately equal to the up quark-down quark mass
difference in our universe. Stenger has compared our
universe with our universe and found no evidence of
fine-tuning. There is no discussion of the life-permitting
range, no discussion of the possible range of mnmp (or
its relation to the possible range of mdmu), and thus no
relevance to fine-tuning whatsoever.
4.8.2 The Strength of the Fundamental Forces
Until now, we have treated the strength of the funda-
mental forces, quantified by the coupling constants a1, a2
and a3 (collectively ai), as constants. In fact, these
parameters are a function of energy due to screening (or
antiscreening) by virtual particles. For example, the
‘running’ of a1 with mass-energy (M) is governed (to first
order) by the following equation (De Boer 1994; Hogan
2000)
@a11
@ lnðM2Þ ¼ 
1
3p
X
Q2i ; ð8Þ
where the sum is over the charges Qi of all fermions of
mass less thanM. If we include all (and only) the particles
of the standard model, then the solution is
a1ðMÞ ¼ 1
a11 ðM0Þ  149p ln M
2
M2
0
  : ð9Þ
The integration constant, a1(M0) is set at a given energy
scale M0. A similar set of equations holds for the other
constants. Stenger asks,
‘What is the significance of this result for the fine-
tuning question? All the claims of the fine-tuning of
the forces of nature have referred to the values of the
force strengths in our current universe. They are
assumed to be constants, but, according to established
theory (even without supersymmetry), they vary with
energy.’ (FOFT 189)
The second sentence is false by definition— a fine-tuning
claim necessarily considers different values of the physi-
cal parameters of our universe. Note that Stenger doesn’t
explicitly answer the question he has posed. If the impli-
cation is that those who have performed theoretical
calculations to determine whether universes with differ-
ent physics would support life have failed to take into
account the running of the coupling constants, then he
should provide references. I know of no scientific paper
on fine-tuning that has used the wrong value of ai for this
reason. For example, for almost all constraints involving
the fine-structure constant, the relevant value is the low
energy limit i.e. the fine structure constant a¼ 1/137. The
fact that a is different at higher energies is not relevant.
Alternatively, if the implication is that the running of
the constants means that one cannot meaningfully con-
sider changes in the ai, then this too is false. As can be seen
from Equation 9, the running of the coupling does not fix
the integration constants. If we choose to fix them at low
energies, then changing the fine-structure constant is
effected by our choice of a1(M0) and a2(M0). The running
of the coupling constants does not change the status of the
ai as free parameters of the theory.
The running of the coupling constants is only relevant
if unification at high energy fixes the integration con-
stants, changing their status from fundamental to derived.
We thus turn to Grand Unification Theories (GUTs), of
which Stenger remarks:
‘[We can] view the universe as starting out in a highly
symmetric state with a single, unified force [with]
strength aU¼ 1/25. At 1037 second, when the temper-
ature of the universe dropped below 3 1016GeV,
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symmetry breaking separated the unified force into
electroweak and strong components yThe electro-
weak force became weaker than the unified force,
while the strong force became stronger. yIn short,
the parameters will differ from one another at low
energies, but not by orders of magnitude.ythe rela-
tion between the force strengths is natural and
predicted by the highly successful standard model,
supplemented by the yet unproved but highly promis-
ing extension that includes supersymmetry. If this turns
out to be correct, and we should know in few years,
then it will have been demonstrated that the strengths
of the strong, electromagnetic, and weak interactions
are fixed by a single parameter, aU, plus whatever
parameters are remaining in the new model that will
take the place of the standard model.’ (FOFT 190)
At the risk of repetition: to show (or conjecture) that a
parameter is derived rather than fundamental does not
mean that it is not fine-tuned. As Stenger has presented it,
grand unification is a cane toad solution, as no attempt is
made to assesswhether theGUTparameters are fine-tuned.
All that we should conclude from Stenger’s discussion is
that the parameters (a1, a2, a3) can be calculated given aU
and MU. The calculation also requires that the masses,
charges and quantum numbers of all fundamental particles
be given to allow terms like
P
Qi
2 to be computed.
What is the life-permitting range of aU andMU? Given
that the evidence for GUTs is still circumstantial, not
much work has been done towards answering this ques-
tion. The pattern a3c a2. a1 seems to be generic, since
‘the antiscreening or asymptotic freedom effect is more
pronounced for larger gauge groups, which have more
types of virtual gluons’ (Wilczek 1997). As can be seen
from Figure 6, this is a good start but hardly guarantees a
life-permitting universe. The strength of the strong force
at low energy increases withMU, so the smallness ofMU/
mPl may be ‘explained’ by the anthropic limits on as. If we
suppose that a and as are related linearly to aU, then the
GUT would constrain the point (a, as) to lie on the blue
dot-dashed line in Figure 6. This replaces the fine-tuning
of the white area with the fine-tuning of the line-segment,
plus the constraints placed on the other GUT parameters
to ensure that the dotted line passes through the white
region at all.
This last point has been emphasised by Hogan
(2007). Figure 7 shows a slice through parameter
space, showing the electron mass (me) and the down-up
quark mass difference (mdmu). The condition labelled
no nuclei was discussed in Section 4.8, point 10.
The line labelled no atoms is the same condition as
point 1, expressed in terms of the quark masses. The
thin solid vertical line shows ‘a constraint from a
particular SO(10) grand unified scenario’ which fixes
md/me. Hogan notes:
[I]f the SO(10) model is the right one, it seems lucky
that its trajectory passes through the region that allows
formolecules. The answer could be that even the gauge
symmetries and particle content also have an anthropic
explanation.
The effect of grand unification on fine-tuning is discussed
in Barrow& Tipler (1986, p. 354). They found that GUTs
provided the tightest anthropic bounds on the fine struc-
ture constant, associated with the decay of the proton into
a positron and the requirement of grand unification below
the Planck scale. These limits are shown in Figure 6 as
solid black lines.
Regarding the spectrum of fundamental particles,
Cahn (1996) notes that if the couplings are fixed at high
energy, then their value at low energy depends on the
masses of particles only ever seen in particle accelerators.
For example, changing the mass of the top quark affects
the fine-structure constant and the mass of the proton (via
LQCD). While the dependence on mt is not particularly
dramatic, it would be interesting to quantify such anthropic
limits within GUTs.
Note also that, just as there are more than one way to
unify the forces of the standard model — SU(5), SO(10),
E8 and more — there is also more than one way to break
the GUT symmetry. I will defer to the expertise of
Schellekens (2008).
‘[T]here is a more serious problem with the concept of
uniqueness here. The groups SU(5) and SO(10) also
have other subgroups beside SU(3) SU(2)U(1). In
other words, after climbing out of our own valley and
reaching the hilltop of SU(5), we discover another road
leading down into a different valley (which may or
may not be inhabitable).’
In otherwords, we not only need the right GUT symmetry,
we need to make sure it breaks in the right way.
A deeper perspective of GUTs comes from string
theory — I will follow the discussion in Schellekens
(2008, p. 62ff.). Since string theory unifies the four
fundamental forces at the Planck scale, it doesn’t really
need grand unification. That is, there is no particular
reason why three of the forces should unify first, three
orders of magnitude below the Planck scale. It seems at
least as easy to get the standard model directly, without
bothering with grand unification. This could suggest that
there are anthropic reasons for why we (possibly) live in a
GUT universe. Grand unification provides a mechanism
for baryon number violation and thus baryogenesis,
though such theories are currently out of favour.
We conclude that anthropic reasoning seems to pro-
vide interesting limits on GUTs, though much work
remains to be done in this area.
4.8.3 Conclusion
Suppose Bob sees Alice throw a dart and hit the
bullseye. ‘Pretty impressive, don’t you think?’, says
Alice. ‘Not at all’, says Bob, ‘the point-of-impact of the
dart can be explained by the velocity with which the dart
left your hand. No fine-tuning is needed.’ On the contrary,
the fine-tuning of the point of impact (i.e. the smallness of
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the bullseye relative to the whole wall) is evidence for the
fine-tuning of the initial velocity.
This fallacy alone makes much of Chapters 7 to 10 of
FOFT irrelevant. The question of the fine-tuning of these
more fundamental parameters is not even asked, making
the whole discussion a cane toad solution. Stenger has
given us no reason to think that the life-permitting region
is larger, or possibility space smaller, than has been
calculated in the fine-tuning literature. The parameters
of the standard model remain some of the best understood
and most impressive cases of fine-tuning.
4.9 Dimensionality of Spacetime
A number of authors have emphasised the life-permitting
properties of the particular combination of one time- and
three space-dimensions, going back to Ehrenfest (1917)
and Whitrow (1955), summarised in Barrow & Tipler
(1986) and Tegmark (1997)32. Figure 9 shows the sum-
mary of the constraints on the number of space and time
dimensions. The number of space dimensions is one of
Rees ‘Just Six Numbers’. FOFT addresses the issue:
‘Martin Rees proposes that the dimensionality of the
universe is one of six parameters that appear particu-
larly adjusted to enable lifeyClearly Rees regards the
dimensionality of space as a property of objective
reality. But is it? I think not. Since the space-time
model is a human invention, so must be the
dimensionality of space-time. We choose it to be three
because it fits the data. In the stringmodel, we choose it
to be ten. We use whatever works, but that does not
mean that reality is exactly that way.’ (FOFT 51)
In response, we do not need to think of dimensionality
as a property of objective reality. We just rephrase the
claim: instead of ‘if space were not three dimensional,
then life would not exist’, we instead claim ‘if whatever
exists were not such that it is accurately described on
macroscopic scales by a model with three space dimen-
sions, then life would not exist’. This (admittedly inele-
gant sentence) makes no claims about the universe being
really three-dimensional. If ‘whatever works’ was four
dimensional, then life would not exist, whether the
number of dimensions is simply a human invention or
an objective fact about the universe. We can still use the
dimensionality of space in counterfactual statements
about how the universe could have been.
String theory is actually an excellent counterexample
to Stenger’s claims. String theorists are not content to
posit ten dimensions and leave it at that. They must
compactify all but 3þ1 of the extra dimensions for the
theory to have a chance of describing our universe. This
fine-tuning case refers to the number of macroscopic or
‘large’ space dimensions, which both string theory and
classical physics agree to be three. The possible existence
of small, compact dimensions is irrelevant.
Finally, Stenger tells us (FOFT 48) that ‘when a model
has passed many risky tests ywe can begin to have
confidence that it is telling us something about the real
world with certainty approaching 100 percent’. One
wonders how the idea that space has three (large) dimen-
sions fails to meet this criterion. Stenger’s worry seems to
be that the three-dimensionality of space may not be a
fundamental property of our universe, but rather an
emergent one. Our model of space as a subset of 33 R3
may crumble into spacetime foam below the Planck
length. But emergent does not imply subjective.Whatever
the fundamental properties of spacetime are, it is an
objective fact about physical reality — by Stenger’s
own criterion — that in the appropriate limit space is
accurately modelled by R3.
The confusion of Stenger’s response is manifest in the
sentence: ‘We choose three [dimensions] because it fits
the data’ (FOFT 51). This isn’t much of a choice. One is
reminded of the man who, when asked why he choose to
join the line for ‘non-hen-pecked husbands’, answered,
‘because my wife told me to’. The universe will let you
choose, for example, your unit of length. But you cannot
decide that the macroscopic world has four space dimen-
sions. It is a mathematical fact that in a universe with four
spatial dimensions you could, with a judicious choice of
axis, make a left-footed shoe into a right-footed one by
rotating it. Our inability to perform such a transformation
is not the result of physicists arbitrarily deciding that, in
32
See also Freeman (1969); Dorling (1970); Gurevich (1971), and the
popular-level discussion in Hawking (1988, p. 180).
Figure 9 Anthropic constraints on the dimensionality of space-
time (from Tegmark 1997). UNPREDICTABLE: the behaviour of
your surroundings cannot be predicted using only local, finite
accuracy data, making storing and processing information impossi-
ble. UNSTABLE: no stable atoms or planetary orbits. TOO SIM-
PLE: no gravitational force in empty space and severe topological
problems for life. TACHYONS ONLY: energy is a vector, and rest
mass is no barrier to particle decay. For example, a electron could
decay into a neutron, an antiproton and a neutrino. Life is perhaps
possible in very cold environments. Reproduced with permission of
IOP Publishing Ltd.
33
Or perhaps Euclidean space E3, or Minkowskian spacetime.
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this spacetime model we’re inventing, space will have
three dimensions.
5 The Multiverse
OnBoxing Day, 2002, Powerball announced that Andrew
J. Whittaker Jr. of West Virginia had won $314.9 million
in their lottery. The odds of this event are 1 in
120 526 770. How could such an unlikely event occur?
Should we accuse Mr Whittaker of cheating? Probably
not, because amore likely explanation is that a great many
different tickets were sold, increasing the chances that
someone would win.
The multiverse is just such an explanation. Perhaps
there are more universes out there (in some sense),
sufficiently numerous and varied that it is not too improb-
able that at least one of them would be in the life-
permitting subset of possible-physics-space. And, just as
Powerball wouldn’t announce that ‘Joe Smith of Chicago
didn’t win the lottery today’, so there is no one in the life-
prohibiting universes to wonder what went wrong.
Stenger says (FOFT24) that he will not need to appeal to
a multiverse in order to explain fine-tuning. He does,
however, keep the multiverse close in case of
emergencies.
‘Cosmologists have proposed a very simple solution to
the fine-tuning problem. Their current models strongly
suggest that ours is not the only universe but part of a
multiverse containing an unlimited number of individ-
ual universes extending an unlimited distance in all
directions and for an unlimited time in the past and
future. yModern cosmological theories do indicate
that ours is just one of an unlimited number of
universes, and theists can give no reason for ruling
them out.’ (FOFT22,42)
Firstly, the difficulty in ruling out multiverses speaks to
their unfalsifiability, rather than their steadfastness in the
face of cosmological data. There is very little evidence,
one way or the other. Moreover, there are plenty of
reasons given in the scientific literature to be skeptical
of the existence of a multiverse. Even their most enthusi-
astic advocate isn’t as certain about the existence of a
multiverse as Stenger suggests.
A multiverse is not part of nor a prediction of the
concordance model of cosmology. It is the existence of
small, adiabatic, nearly-scale invariant, Gaussian fluctua-
tions in a very-nearly-flat FLRW model (containing
dark energy, dark matter, baryons and radiation) that is
strongly suggested by the data. Inflation is one idea of
how to explain this data. Some theories of inflation, such
as chaotic inflation, predict that some of the properties of
universes vary from place to place. Carr & Ellis (2008)
write:
[Ellis:] A multiverse is implied by some forms of
inflation but not others. Inflation is not yet a well
defined theory and chaotic inflation is just one variant
of it.ythe key physics involved in chaotic inflation
(Coleman-de Luccia tunnelling) is extrapolated from
known and tested physics to quite different regimes;
that extrapolation is unverified and indeed unveri-
fiable. The physics is hypothetical rather than tested.
We are being told that what we have is ‘known
physics - multiverse’. But the real situation is
‘known physics - hypothetical physics - multi-
verse’ and the first step involves a major extrapolation
which may or may not be correct.
Stenger fails to distinguish between the concordance
model of cosmology, which has excellent empirical
support but in no way predicts a multiverse, and specula-
tive models of the early universe, only some of which
predict a multiverse, all of which rely on hypothetical
physics, and none of which have unambiguous empirical
support, if any at all.
5.1 How to Make A Multiverse
What does it take to specify amultiverse? Following Ellis,
Kirchner & Stoeger (2004), we need to:
 Determine the set of possible universesM.
 Characterise each universe inM by a set P of distin-
guishing parameters p, being careful to create equiva-
lence classes of physically identical universes with
different p. The parameters p will need to specify the
laws of nature, the parameters of those laws and
the particular solution to those laws that describes the
given member m ofM, which usually involves initial
or boundary conditions.
 Propose a distribution function f(m) onM, specifying
how many times each possible universe m is realised.
Note that simply saying that all possibilities exist only
tells us that f(m). 0 for all m in M. It does not
specify f(m).
 Define a distribution function over continuous para-
meters, relative to a measure p, which assigns a
probability space volume to each parameter increment.
We would also like to know the set of universes
which allow the existence of conscious observers — the
anthropic subset.
As Ellis et al. (2004) point out, any such proposal will
have to deal with the problems of what determines
{M; f ðmÞ; p}, actualized infinities (inM, f(m) and the
spatial extent of universes) and non-renormalisability, the
parameter dependence and non-uniqueness of p, and how
one could possibly observationally confirm any of these
quantities. If some meta-law is proposed to physically
generate a multiverse, then we need to postulate not just
a.) that the meta-law holds in this universe, but b.) that it
holds in some pre-existing metaspace beyond our uni-
verse. There is no unambiguous evidence in favour of a.)
for anymultiverse, and b.) will surely forever hold the title
of the most extreme extrapolation in all of science, if
indeed it can be counted as part of science.We turn to this
topic now.
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5.2 Is it Science?
Could a multiverse proposal ever be regarded as scien-
tific? FOFT 228 notes the similarity between undetectable
universes and undetectable quarks, but the analogy is not a
good one. The properties of quarks —mass, charge, spin,
etc.— can be inferred frommeasurements. Quarks have a
causal effect on particle accelerator measurements; if the
quark model were wrong, we would know about it. In
contrast, we cannot observe any of the properties of a
multiverse {M; f ðmÞ; p}, as they have no causal effect
on our universe. We could be completely wrong about
everything we believe about these other universes and no
observation could correct us. The information is not here.
The history of science has repeatedly taught us that
experimental testing is not an optional extra. The
hypothesis that a multiverse actually exists will always be
untestable.
The most optimistic scenario is where a physical
theory, which has been well-tested in our universe, pre-
dicts a universe-generating mechanism. Even then, there
would still be questions beyond the reach of observation,
such as whether the necessary initial conditions for the
generator hold in the metaspace, and whether there are
modifications to the physical theory that arise at energy
scales or on length scales relevant to the multiverse but
beyond testing in our universe. Moreover, the process by
which a new universe is spawned almost certainly cannot
be observed.
5.3 The Principle of Mediocrity
One way of testing a particular multiverse proposal is
the so-called principle of mediocrity. This is a self-
consistency test — it cannot pick out a unique multiverse
as the ‘real’ multiverse — but can be quite powerful.
We will present the principle using an illustration.
Boltzmann (1895), having discussed the discovery that
the second law of thermodynamics is statistical in nature,
asks why the universe is currently so far from thermal
equilibrium. Perhaps, Boltzmann says, the universe as a
whole is in thermal equilibrium. From time to time,
however, a random statistical fluctuation will produce a
region which is far from equilibrium. Since life requires
low entropy, it could only form in such regions. Thus, a
randomly chosen region of the universe would almost
certainly be in thermal equilibrium. But if one were to
take a survey of all the intelligent life in such a universe,
one would find them all scratching their heads at the
surprisingly low entropy of their surroundings.
It is a brilliant idea, and yet something is wrong34. At
most, life only needs a low entropy fluctuation a few tens
of Mpc in size — cosmological structure simulations
show that the rest of the universe has had virtually no
effect on galaxy/star/planet/life formation where we are.
And yet, we find ourselves in a low entropy region that is
tens of thousands of Mpc in size, as far as our telescopes
can see.
Why is this a problem? Because the probability of a
thermal fluctuation decreases exponentially with its vol-
ume. This means that a random observer is overwhelm-
ingly likely to observe that they are in the smallest
fluctuation able to support an observer. If one were to
take a survey of all the life in the multiverse, an incredibly
small fraction would observe that they are inside a
fluctuation whose volume is at least a billion times larger
than their existence requires. In fact, our survey would
find vastly manymore observers who were simply isolated
brains that fluctuated into existence preloaded with false
thoughts about being in a large fluctuation. It is more
likely that we arewrong about the size of the universe, that
the distant galaxies are just a mirage on the face of the
thermal equilibrium around us. The Boltzmann multi-
verse is thus definitively ruled out.
5.4 Coolness and the Measure Problem
Do more modern multiverse proposals escape the medi-
ocrity test? Tegmark (2005) discusses what is known as
the coolness problem, also known as the youngness par-
adox. Suppose that inflation is eternal, in the sense (Guth
2007) the universe is always a mix of inflating and non-
inflating regions. In our universe, inflation ended 13.7
billion years ago and a period of matter-dominated,
decelerating expansion began. Meanwhile, other regions
continued to inflate. Let’s freeze the whole multiverse
now, and take our survey clipboard around to all parts of
the multiverse. In the regions that are still inflating, there
is almost no matter and so no life. So we need to look for
life in the parts that have stopped inflating. Whenever we
find an intelligent life form, we’ll ask how long ago their
part of the universe stopped inflating. Since the temper-
ature of a post-inflation region is at its highest just as
inflation ends and drops as the universe expands, we could
equivalently ask: what is the temperature of the CMB in
your universe?
The results of this survey would be rather surprising:
an extremely small fraction of life-permitting universes
are as old and cold as ours. Why? Because other parts of
the universe continued to inflate after ours had stopped.
These regions become exponentially larger, and thus
nucleate exponentially more matter-dominated regions,
all of which are slightly younger and warmer than ours.
There are two effects here: there are many more younger
universes, but they will have had less time to make
intelligent life. Which effect wins? Are there more intel-
ligent observers who formed early in younger universes or
later in older universes? It turns out that the exponential
expansion of inflation wins rather comfortably. For every
observer in a universe as old as ours, there are 1010
38
observers who live in a universe that is one second
younger. The probability of observing a universe with a
CMB temperature of 2.75K or less is approximately
1 in 1010
56
.
34
Actually, there are several things wrong, not least that such a scenario
is unstable to gravitational collapse.
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Alas! Is this the end of the inflationary multiverse as
we know it? Not necessarily. The catch comes in the
seemingly innocent word now. We are considering the
multiverse at a particular time. But general relativity will
not allow it — there is no unique way to specify ‘now’.
We can’t just compare our universe with all the other
universes in existence ‘now’. But we must be able to
compare the properties of our universe with some subset
of the multiverse — otherwise the multiverse proposal
cannot make predictions. This is the ‘measure problem’ of
cosmology, on which there is an extensive literature —
Page (2011a) lists 70 scientific papers. As Linde &
Noorbala (2010) explains, one of the main problems is
that ‘in an eternally inflating universe the total volume
occupied by all, even absolutely rare types of the ‘uni-
verses’, is indefinitely large’. We are thus faced with
comparing infinities. In fact, even if inflation is not eternal
and the universe is finite, the measure problem can still
paralyse our analysis.
The moral of the coolness problem is not that the
inflationary multiverse has been falsified. Rather, it is
this: no measure, no nothing. For a multiverse proposal to
make predictions, it must be able to calculate and justify a
measure over the set of universes it creates. The predic-
tions of the inflationary multiverse are very sensitive to
the measure, and thus in the absence of a measure, we
cannot conclude that it survives the test of the principle of
mediocrity.
5.5 Our Island in the Multiverse
A closer look at our island in parameter space reveals a
refinement of the mediocrity test, as discussed by Aguirre
(2007); see also Bousso, Hall & Nomura (2009). It is
called the ‘principle of living dangerously’: if the prior
probability for a parameter is a rapidly increasing (or
decreasing) function, then we expect the observed value
of the parameter to lie near the edge of the anthropically
allowed range. One particular parameter for which this
could be a problem is Q, as discussed in Section 4.5.
Fixing other cosmological parameters, the anthropically
allowed range is 106tQt 104. The observed value
(,105) isn’t close to either edge of the anthropic range.
This creates problems for inflationary multiverses, which
are either fine-tuned to have the prior for Q to peak near
the observed value, or else are steep functions of Q in the
anthropic range (Graesser et al. 2004; Feldstein, Hall &
Watari 2005).
The discovery of another life-permitting island in
parameter space potentially creates a problem for the
multiverse. If the other island is significantly larger than
ours (for a given multiverse measure), then observers
should expect to be on the other island. An example is the
cold big bang, as described by Aguirre (2001). Aguirre’s
aim in the paper is to provide a counterexample to what he
calls the anthropic program: ‘the computation of P [the
probability that a randomly chosen observer measures a
given set of cosmological parameters]; if this probability
distribution has a single peak at a set [of parameters] and
if these are near the measured values, then it could be
claimed that the anthropic program has ‘explained’ the
values of the parameters of our cosmology’. Aguirre’s
concern is a lack of uniqueness.
The cold big bang (CBB) is a model of the universe in
which the (primordial) ratio of photons to baryons is
Zg, 1. To be a serious contender as a model of our
universe (in which Zg, 109) there would need to be an
early population of luminous objects e.g. PopIII stars.
Nucleosynthesis generally proceeds further than in our
universe, creating an approximately solar metalicity
intergalactic medium along with a 25% helium mass
fraction35. Structure formation is not suppressed by
CMB radiation pressure, and thus stars and galaxies
require a smaller value of Q.
How much of a problem is the cold big bang to a
multiverse explanation of cosmological parameters? Par-
ticles and antiparticles pair off and mutually annihilate to
photons as the universe cools, so the excess of particles
over antiparticles determines the value of Zg. We are thus
again faced with the absence of a successful theory of
baryogenesis and leptogenesis. It could be that small
values of Zg, which correspond to larger baryon and
lepton asymmetry, are very rare in the multiverse. Never-
theless, the conclusion of Aguirre (2001) seems sound:
‘[the CBB] should be discouraging for proponents of the
anthropic program: it implies that it is quite important to
know the [prior] probabilities P, which depend on poorly
constrained models of the early universe’.
Does the cold big bang imply that cosmology need not
be fine-tuned to be life-permitting? Aguirre (2001) claims
that x(Zg, 1, 1011,Q, 105), x(Zg, 109, 106,
Q, 104), where x is the number of solar mass stars per
baryon. At best, this would show that there is a continuous
life-permitting region, stretching along the Zg axis. Various
compensating factors are needed along the way—we need
a smaller value of Q, which renders atomic cooling ineffi-
cient, so wemust rely onmolecular cooling, which requires
higher densities and metalicities, but not too high or
planetary orbits will be disrupted collisions (whose fre-
quency increases as Zg
4Q7/2). Aguirre (2001) only con-
siders the case Zg, 1 in detail, so it is not clear whether the
CBB island connects to the HBB island (106t Zgt 1011)
investigated by Tegmark & Rees (1998). Either way, life
does not have free run of parameter space.
5.6 Boltzmann’s Revenge
The spectre of the demise of Boltzmann’s multiverse
haunts more modern cosmologies in two different ways.
35
Stenger states that ‘[t]he cold big-bang model shows that we don’t
necessarily need the Hoyle resonance, or even significant stellar nucleo-
synthesis, for life’. It shows nothing of the sort. The CBB does not alter
nuclear physics and thus still relies on the triple-a process to create
carbon in the early universe; see the more detailed discussion of CBB
nucleosynthesis in Aguirre (1999, p. 22). Further, CBB does not negate
the need for long-lived, nuclear-fueled stars as an energy source for
planetary life. Aguirre (2001) is thus justifiably eager to demonstrate that
stars will plausibly form in a CBB universe.
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The first is the possibility ofBoltzmann brains.We should
be wary of any multiverse which allows for single brains,
imprinted with memories, to fluctuate into existence. The
worry is that, for every observer who really is a carbon-
based life formwho evolved on a planet orbiting a star in a
galaxy, there are vastlymore for whom this is all a passing
dream, the few, fleeting fancies of a phantom fluctuation.
This could be a problem in our universe — if the current,
accelerating phase of the universe persists arbitrarily into
the future, then our universe will become vacuum domi-
nated. Observers like us will die out, and eventually
Boltzmann brains, dreaming that they are us, will out-
number us. The most serious problem is that, unlike
biologically evolved life like ourselves, Boltzmann brains
do not require a fine-tuned universe. If we condition on
observers, rather than biological evolved life, then the
multiverse may fail to predict a universe like ours. The
multiverse would not explain why our universe is fine-
tuned for biological life (R. Collins, forthcoming).
Another argument against the multiverse is given by
Penrose (2004, p. 763ff). As with the Boltzmann multi-
verse, the problem is that this universe seems uncomfort-
ably roomy.
‘ydowe really need thewhole observable universe, in
order that sentient life can come about? This seems
unlikely. It is hard to imagine that even anything
outside our galaxy would be neededyLet us be very
generous and ask that a region of radius one tenth of the
yobservable universemust resemble the universe that
we know, but we do not care about what happens
outside that radiusyAssuming that inflation acts in
the same way on the small region [that inflated into the
one-tenth smaller universe] as it would on the some-
what larger one [that inflated into ours], but producing
a smaller inflated universe, in proportion, we can
estimate howmuchmore frequently the Creator comes
across the smaller than the larger regions. The figure is
no better than 1010
123
. You see what an incredible
extravagance it was (in terms of probability) for the
Creator to bother to produce this extra distant part of
the universe, that we don’t actually need yfor our
existence.’
In other words, if we live in a multiverse generated by a
process like chaotic inflation, then for every observer who
observes a universe of our size, there are 1010
123
who
observe a universe that is just 10 times smaller. This
particular multiverse dies the same death as the Boltz-
mann multiverse. Penrose’s argument is based on the
place of our universe in phase space, and is thus generic
enough to apply to any multiverse proposal that creates
more small universe domains than large ones. Most
multiverse mechanisms seem to fall into this category.
5.7 Conclusion
A multiverse generated by a simple underlying mecha-
nism is a remarkably seductive idea. The mechanism
would be an extrapolation of known physics, that is,
physics with an impressive record of explaining obser-
vations from our universe. The extrapolation would be
natural, almost inevitable. The universe as we know it
would be a very small part of a much larger whole.
Cosmology would explore the possibilities of particle
physics; what we know as particle physics would be mere
by-laws in an unimaginably vast and variegated cosmos.
The multiverse would predict what we expect to observe
by predicting what conditions hold in universes able to
support observers.
Sadly, most of this scenario is still hypothetical. The
goal of this section has been to demonstrate the mountain
that the multiverse is yet to climb, the challenges that it
must face openly and honestly. The multiverse may yet
solve the fine-tuning of the universe for intelligent life,
but it will not be an easy solution. ‘Multiverse’ is not a
magic word that will make all the fine-tuning go away.
For a popular discussion of these issues, see Ellis (2011).
6 Conclusions and Future
We conclude that the universe is fine-tuned for the exis-
tence of life. Of all the ways that the laws of nature,
constants of physics and initial conditions of the universe
could have been, only a very small subset permits the
existence of intelligent life.
Will future progress in fundamental physics solve the
problem of the fine-tuning of the universe for intelligent
life, without the need for a multiverse? There are a few
ways that this could happen. We could discover that the
set of life-permitting universes is much larger than previ-
ously thought. This is unlikely, since the physics relevant
to life is low-energy physics, and thus well-understood.
Physics at the Planck scale will not rewrite the standard
model of particle physics. It is sometimes objected that we
do not have an adequate definition of ‘an observer’, and
we do not know all possible forms of life. This is reason
for caution, but not a fatal flaw of fine-tuning. If the strong
force were weaker, the periodic table would consist of
only hydrogen. We do not need a rigorous definition of
life to reasonably conclude that a universe with one
chemical reaction (2H- H2) would not be able to create
and sustain the complexity necessary for life.
Alternatively, we could discover that the set of possi-
ble universes is much smaller than we thought. This
scenario is much more interesting. What if, when we
really understand the laws of nature, we will realise that
they could not have been different? We must be clear
about the claim beingmade. If the claim is that the laws of
nature are fixed by logical and mathematical necessity,
then this is demonstrably wrong — theoretical physicists
find it rather easy to describe alternative universes that are
free from logical contradiction (Davies, in Davies 2003).
The category of ‘physically possible’ isn’t much help
either, as the laws of nature tell us what is physically
possible, but not which laws are possible.
It is not true that fine-tuning must eventually yield to
the relentless march of science. Fine-tuning is not a
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typical scientific problem, that is, a phenomenon in our
universe that cannot be explained by our current under-
standing of physical laws. It is not a gap. Rather, we are
concerned with the physical laws themselves. In particu-
lar, the anthropic coincidences are not like, say, the
coincidence between inertial mass and gravitational mass
in Newtonian gravity, which is a coincidence between
two seemingly independent physical quantities.
Anthropic coincidences, on the other hand, involve a
happy consonance between a physical quantity and the
requirements of complex, embodied intelligent life. The
anthropic coincidences are so arresting because we are
accustomed to thinking of physical laws and initial con-
ditions as being unconcerned with how things turn out.
Physical laws are material and efficient causes, not final
causes. There is, then, no reason to think that future
progress in physics will render a life-permitting universe
inevitable. When physics is finished, when the equation is
written on the blackboard and fundamental physics has
gone as deep as it can go, fine-tuning may remain, basic
and irreducible.
Perhaps the most optimistic scenario is that we will
eventually discover a simple, beautiful physical principle
from which we can derive a unique physical theory,
whose unique solution describes the universe as we know
it, including the standard model, quantum gravity, and
(dare we hope) the initial conditions of cosmology.While
this has been the dream of physicists for centuries, there is
not the slightest bit of evidence that this idea is true. It is
almost certainly not true of our best hope for a theory of
quantum gravity, string theory, which has ‘anthropic
principle written all over it’ (Schellekens 2008). The
beauty of its principles has not saved us from the com-
plexity and contingency of the solutions to its equations.
Beauty and simplicity are not necessity.
Finally, it would be the ultimate anthropic coincidence
if beauty and complexity in the mathematical principles
of the fundamental theory of physics produced all the
necessary low-energy conditions for intelligent life. This
point has been made by a number of authors, e.g. Carr &
Rees (1979) and Aguirre (2005). Here is Wilczek
(2006b):
‘It is logically possible that parameters determined
uniquely by abstract theoretical principles just happen
to exhibit all the apparent fine-tunings required to
produce, by a lucky coincidence, a universe containing
complex structures. But that, I think, really strains
credulity.’
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